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ABSTRACT 
The European Parliament has been working towards building a discussion platform and a 
resource for further policy actions in the field of intellectual property rights. The Science 
and Technology Options Assessment Panel has set the goal of further enlarging the area 
of investigation in light of recent policy developments at the European level. In particular, 
the current study covers current policy issues in the governance of the European patent 
system, such as the backlog issue, the enhancement of patent awareness within the 
European Parliament, patent enforcement, the regional dimension of intellectual property 
in Europe, patents and standardisation, the use of existing patents, and patents and 
competition. These issues were discussed in the conference with stakeholders from 
European to national patent offices, from private to public sector actors. As a result of 
the conference, it was stated the need for an IP strategy for Europe. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel of the European 
Parliament published the final report of its project on ‘Policy options for the improvement 
of the European patent system’ in 2007. As a follow up to this, the Panel launched the 
project ‘Current Policy Issues in the Governance of the European patent system’ in 2009. 
As the first step in the current project, and in view of the results of the previous project, 
the Panel has organised a conference with the goal of reviewing issues related to the 
current status of governance of the European patent system.  
The European Parliament has been working towards building a discussion platform and a 
resource for further policy actions in the field of intellectual property rights. The Science 
and Technology Options Assessment Panel has set the goal of further enlarging the area 
of investigation in light of recent policy developments at the European level. In addition, 
issues related to intellectual property (IP) are of interest to several different committees. 
Therefore, a common forum within the European Parliament could be set up in order to 
ensure coherent IP policy design, as stated in the policy options for the improvement of 
the European patent system. 
One important aim is to work towards building a discussion platform and a resource for 
further policy actions linking Members of the European Parliament from different 
committees with stakeholders in order to improve decision-making on patent-related 
issues. It might be difficult for the current body of parliamentarians to make any 
commitments because of the approaching end of their terms. For this reason, the Lisbon 
Forum is regarded as a plausible solution to bridge the gap between the two legislative 
periods. 
A Draft Report was prepared as a background paper for the conference. That paper and 
the input from the conference have contributed to the formulation of this Final Report. It 
is worth mentioning that the results of the project are not expected to support, defend or 
contest any of these issues, but rather to analyse them realistically, and to signal to what 
extent they may cause a need for policy intervention. Indeed, different opinions exist 
about the acuteness of the issues. This study aims at providing a balanced view on how 
important these problems are and why. The topics of this study follow. 
The backlog issue: Over the last decade, the time for getting a patent, as well as the 
related backlog of patents has risen considerably. The consequence of this is an increase 
of legal uncertainty. 
Patent enforcement: While European legislators are still negotiating a European Union 
(EU) Patent Litigation System which should handle disputes relating to both existing 
European Patents and Future Community Patents, small and medium size enterprises 
(SMEs) already encounter difficulties in enforcing their rights before national jurisdictions.  
Regional dimension of IPR in Europe: The EU's Regional Policy is more and more 
associated with the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy, which aims at building up 
Europe as a world leader in the field of the 'Knowledge Based Economy.' Consequently, 
the funds made available for achieving this goal, which come under the competitiveness 
programmes, have dramatically increased over the past few years.  
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Patent and standardisation: In an information and communication technology (ICT) 
oriented world, standards are a key driver for innovation. However, co-existence with 
patents raises some questions. What could be the interface between ICT standardisation 
policy, IPR and competition law? What could be the balance between IPR, inter-
operability and competitiveness? How to ensure a correct balance between the interests 
of licensees and licensors and the transparency of licensing? How to identify relevant IPR 
in connection with standards?  
The use of existing patents: Third Parties have access to relevant information relating to 
European patent applications via free access websites. However, once the European 
patent has been granted, it becomes a bundle of national patents governed by national 
laws.  
Patent and competition: In the past few decades, the European Court of Justice has 
made the legal distinction between the existence and the exercise of IPR. While the first 
is not challenged per se, the second one has to comply with competition rules. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel of the European 
Parliament published the final report of its project on ‘Policy options for the improvement 
of the European patent system’ in 2007. As a follow up to this, the STOA Panel launched 
the project ‘Current Policy Issues in the Governance of the European patent system’ in 
2009. According to the study commissioned by the STOA Panel of the European 
Parliament (Cowan et al., 2007), the policy recommendations for the improvement of the 
European patent system are: 
(i) Inserting the economic mission of the Patent System in the European Patent 
Convention (EPC) by: 
 placing a preamble in the EPC, stating clearly and transparently the economic 
mission of the patent system. 
(ii) Enhancing the governance within the European patent system by: 
 establishing a standing committee within the European Parliament, which would 
focus on improving patent awareness among parliamentarians; 
 creating a link between the European Parliament’s standing committee and an 
independent and external advisory body; 
 encouraging dialogue between the standing committee and the external body to 
deal with broader economic and social questions arising from trends and practices 
within the patent system; 
 developing regular and public communication of patent policy decisions made by 
the Administrative Council of the European Patent Office (EPO); and 
 ensuring a stronger patent competence in the Commission, and greater 
consultation of interested parties. 
(iii) Improving quality aspects in regard to patentability standards and patent grant 
procedures by: 
 introducing measures to counter-balance the pressure to grant a patent; 
 discouraging the filing of lengthy and overly-complex patent applications;  
 reducing the possibility for applicants to unduly prolong or complicate the 
examination procedure; 
 involving third parties in the collection and evaluation of information on prior art; 
 promoting the incentives for applicants to make their application public before the 
18-month limit; and 
 raising the standards for the inventive step requirement. 
(iv) Dealing with emerging technologies by: 
 allocating additional resources to EPO examiners in order to better assess prior art 
and avoid too broad patents; 
 ensuring on-going deliberations on what is patentable and what is not. 
  
IP/A/STOA/2009-01 6 PE 424.763
Current policy issues in the governance of the European patent system 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(v) Increasing access to patented inventions by: 
 exploring and supporting more flexible, non-exclusive exercises of patent rights, 
such as licence of rights, patent pools and clearing houses. 
(vi) Facilitating defensive publications by: 
 making possible the practice of the defensive publication of inventions into a 
publicly-available database. 
 
1.2 Approach 
Taking into account the previous policy recommendations, we conducted a review of 
previous academic and policy-making documents. For academic publications, we used 
Thomson Scientific’s Web of Science, Elsevier’s Scopus and Google Scholar as search 
engines in order to retrieve state-of-the-art literature. For policy-making documents, we 
employed Eur-lex, which provides online access to the EU official journal, treaties, 
legislation in force, preparatory acts, case law, and documents from the European 
Parliament, Council and Commission. 
Further, the literature review addressed the research questions listed below, taking into 
account the policy options for each of the topics, viz. the backlog issue, the enhancement 
of patent awareness within the European Parliament, patent enforcement, the regional 
dimension of IP in Europe, patents and standardisation, the use of existing patents, and 
patents and competition. 
The documents were selected because of direct relationship with the topics of the study. 
The academic and policy sources are listed in the reference list. An explanation of the 
analytic tool chosen is provided in the common structure (problématique, what is already 
known, what is new, policy implications) used to conduct the literature review. 
In addition, we searched for relevant references dealing with the topics, and then sorted 
them into a coherent view of the state of the art as it now stands. In particular, we 
followed a common structure while carrying out the literature review: 
1. Problématique: What is the issue at stake here? Why is it relevant? Why 
are we discussing this in the first place? 
2. What is already known: What is the knowledge we are building upon? What 
has already been established? What is the current ‘state of the art’ in the 
topic? 
3. What is new: What are the recent developments? What is currently being 
debated? What have we learned from the references? Which are the points 
of contention and their implications? 
4. Policy implications: What are the future avenues of research or debate? 
What are the ‘blind spots’ that still need to be tackled? Where is the topic 
or issue headed? Is there a need either for policy options or fields that 
require policy actions? Are the major issues studied in the project being 
left out of the mainstream legislative process? 
The literature review discussed published information on the particular topics. This 
literature review had an organizational pattern and combined both summary and 
synthesis. This literature review provides a guide to the topics and gives an overview or 
act as a stepping stone for further academic research where analytic tools can be 
employed, such as discourse analysis or document analysis. 
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In particular, we carried out the following tasks to achieve the overall aim: 
 Retrieve references 
 Review selected publications 
 Digest and distil content 
 Draft the review and provide policy recommendations 
 Validate findings and suggestions by relevant stakeholders. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the results of the project are not expected to support, 
defend or contest, any of these issues, but rather to analyse them realistically, and to 
signalise to what extent they may cause a need for policy intervention. Indeed, different 
opinions exist about the acuteness of the issues. In this respect, this study aims at 
providing a balanced view on how important these problems are and why. 
 
1.3 The topics of the study 
The Science and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) Panel of the European 
Parliament has set the goal of further enlarging the area of investigation in light of recent 
policy developments at the European level. It is worth mentioning that the topics of the 
study have been commissioned by STOA, and have not been extracted from and defined 
through the literature review itself. In particular, this study covers current policy issues 
in the governance of the European patent system organised as follows: 
 The backlog issue 
 Enhancement of patent awareness within the European Parliament  
 Patent enforcement 
 Regional dimension of IP in Europe 
 Patents and standardisation 
 The use of existing patents 
 Patents and competition 
The backlog issue  
Over the last decade, the pendency time for getting a patent, as well as the related 
backlog of patents, that the EPO has had to cope with has risen considerably. The direct 
consequence of this is an increase of legal uncertainty, because during this period of 
time, third parties have no clue about the future of the application (withdrawal, granting 
or rejection), nor of the exact scope of protection (in cases where the patent is granted). 
For the credibility of the patent system, it is of the utmost importance to ensure the 
shortest possible pendency time. 
Enhancing Patent Awareness within the European Parliament - Standing Committee on 
IPR  
Currently, the Council is dealing with IPR policy-making and the European Parliament 
being only consulted. Once the Lisbon Treaty will enter into force, the European 
Parliament will be associated to the Council in decision-making regarding IPR policy.  
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The new article 97a stipulates that: "In the context of the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market, the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance 
with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish measures for the creation of 
European intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of intellectual property 
rights throughout the Union and for the setting up of centralized Union-wide 
authorization, coordination and supervision arrangements. The Council, acting in 
accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall by means of regulations establish 
language arrangements for the European intellectual property rights. The Council shall 
act unanimously after consulting the European Parliament." 
In addition, issues related to IP are of interest for different committees such as JURI, 
IMCO, ITRE (for the technical and economic aspects), REGI (for the regional aspects of 
IP), and INTA (IP chapters in the Free Trade Agreements). Therefore, a common forum 
within the European Parliament could be set up in order to ensure coherent IP 
development within the Parliament, as stated in the policy options for the improvement 
of the European Patent System. A more appropriate structure (e.g. a standing 
committee, or a working committee with links to different committees) could be further 
explored.  
Patent enforcement  
While European legislators are still negotiating a EU Patent Litigation System which 
should handle disputes relating, at the European level, to both existing European Patents 
and Future Community Patents, SMEs already encounter huge difficulties in enforcing 
their rights before national jurisdictions. SMEs argue that court and legal fees are too 
high and do not allow them to take appropriate action before the courts. Thus, there is 
little interest for SMEs to get patents if they are not in a position to enforce them. 
Therefore, it would be necessary to find special schemes for SMEs: lower court fees, IP 
insurance (which could cover expenses relating to any legal action), Alternative Dispute 
Resolutions (mediation, arbitration) etc. 
Regional dimension of IP in Europe  
The EU's Regional Policy is more and more associated with the achievement of the Lisbon 
Strategy, which aims at building up Europe as a world leader in the field of the 
'Knowledge Based Economy.' Consequently, the funds made available for achieving this 
goal, which come under the competitiveness programmes, have dramatically increased 
over the past few years. In this light, patents are one of the major tools which can foster 
innovation. Therefore, projects which could give an incentive towards the transfer of IP 
from academia to industry, and subsequently lead to the development of marketed 
products, should be encouraged in the future. 
Patent and standardisation  
In an ICT-oriented world, standards are a key issue. However, co-existence with patents 
could lead to tricky issues. What could be the interface between the ICT standardisation 
policy, IP and competition law? What could be the balance between IP, inter-operability 
and competitiveness? How to ensure a correct balance between the interests of licensees 
and licensors and the transparency of licensing? How to identify relevant IP in connection 
with standards?  
IP/A/STOA/2009-01 9 PE 424.763
STOA - Science and Technology Options Assessment 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The use of existing patents  
Third Parties have access to relevant information relating to European patent applications 
via free access websites, such as http://ep.espacenet.com/. However, once the European 
patent has been granted, it becomes a bundle of national patents governed by national 
laws. Consequently, third parties have to make enquiries in each Member State in which 
the patent has been granted, in order to know the status of the different national patents 
(still in force, existence of licenses, etc.). It would be useful to provide all the relevant 
information regarding the same patents on a unique database, which would help third 
parties in the preparation of strategies vis-à-vis these patents (analyses of the protected 
market, request for licenses). It would also ensure a better fluidity of the market for the 
benefit of Europe.  
Patent and competition  
In the past few decades, the European Court of Justice has made the legal distinction 
between the existence and the exercise of IP rights: while the first is not challenged of 
itself, the second one has to comply with competition rules (cartel, abuse of rights). Over 
the last few years, this question has become more and more pertinent. For example, the 
Commission has recently launched a sector specific enquiry in the pharmaceutical field, 
with a view to detect potential misuse of patents. Microsoft was also recently fined for 
blocking third party access to its technology. This issue could be re-visited in light of 
these recent developments. 
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2 THE BACKLOG ISSUE 
 
2.1 Problématique 
According to the European Patent Office (EPO 2008a), the growing number of 
applications across the globe is leading to one particular challenge affecting every patent 
office – a large backlog. Thanks to a large staff and a relatively efficient application 
system, the European Patent Office has managed to keep its average first-action 
pendency period for patent examination down to between six and nine months, despite 
an official backlog of 284,414 in 2005. This compares with 21 months in the United 
States Patent Office and 26 months in the Japan Patent Office. Unlike other offices, the 
European Patent Office does not practice outsourcing. 
The European Patent Office has witnessed a radical surge in the size of its workload. The 
most striking increase has been in the number of patent applications at the European 
Patent Office. From about 20,000 in the early 1980s, patent filings had jumped to 
192,000 in 2005. This ten-fold increase in the number of patents has been accompanied 
by a parallel evolution, although to a lower extent, of both the average number of pages 
and the average number of claims per filing, which have doubled between 1980 and 
2005. Over the past 25 years, the workload of the European Patent Office has been 
multiplied by 20 (van Pottelsberghe, 2007). 
This drastic increase raises a crucial workload issue for the European Patent Office and an 
important quality issue for the European patent system in general. A large proportion of 
the recent patents describe only a small improvement upon the state of the art. The 
increased volume makes determining the actual state of the art almost impossible. One 
consequence is that a vicious cycle has taken place, including ‘doubtful’ applications 
being filed, which increases the workload, and hence may reduce efficiency (Philipp, 
2006). 
In a statement, the European Patent Office President Ms Alison Brimelow said that: ‘the 
purpose of patents is to support the generation of economic benefits for society. 
However, large patent numbers are not necessarily indicative of growing research and 
development activity. What we therefore need is not more patents, but more, better 
patents. The European Patent Office aims to make sure that the patents it grants are 
relevant’ (Barraclough, 2008). 
2.2 What we already know 
At the end of the 20th century, there were broadly-expressed concerns about quality in 
the patent system. The operational challenges that have raised these questions include 
the high volume of applications, many of which may not proceed to be granted but which 
meanwhile sit as potential threats to others’ inventions. High volumes lead to backlog. 
This creates opportunities for industry to exploit uncertainty: high volumes of pending 
applications become bargaining chips in negotiations. Although such delay is rarely in the 
wider public interest, for some applicants it is convenient; for example, where 
technologies have a long payback period, or where the precise utility of an invention is 
not apparent at the time of filing. There is also concern that, faced with high pendency 
rates, patent offices ask examiners to work faster, risking them missing relevant prior art 
or misjudging obviousness (EPO, 2007). 
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Several factors partly explain this increase in patent applications. The differences in the 
size of Patent-Cooperation-Treaty1- and non-Patent-Cooperation-Treaty-applications 
reflect the impact of different patent systems and their harmonisation. The first filings at 
the United States Patent Office generally have a much higher number of claims than the 
first filings at the European Patent Office. As a Patent-Cooperation-Treaty filing is an 
international route that later allows the transfer of the application to several regional or 
national patent offices, applicants tend to apply for a single patent that will be 
transferred internationally, instead of several patents for different jurisdictions. In this 
respect, the Patent-Cooperation-Treaty filings seem to be more adapted to the American 
patent system than to the European one (Archontopoulos et al., 2006). 
In particular, a typology of filing strategies has been used by Stevnsborg and van 
Pottelsberghe (2007) to characterise the applicant’s behaviour: a good will with fast and 
slow track, a bad will with slow track and a deliberate abuse of the patent system. The 
chosen strategy will affect the patenting route, the patenting drafting style and the 
interaction with the European Patent Office. The deliberate abuse of the system includes 
drafting the application in a style that is deliberately deficient (i.e. with a large number of 
claims) and may induce an unwanted burden on the patent office, a disproportionate 
degree of uncertainty for competitors and the public at large, and an unclear published 
prior art. 
Second, differences between sectors make up another factor which partly explains this 
evolution. For instance, biotechnology as well as information and communication 
technologies were the most dynamic sectors in terms of patenting over the past 10 
years. In 2005, the patent filings in biotechnology contained 35 claims on average and 
communication and information technologies included 26 claims on average. Besides, a 
higher propensity to patent inventions has been observed for all technologies and in all 
countries, mainly driven by strategic patenting, such as patent thickets, picket fences, 
inventing around and defensive patenting (Guellec et al., 2007). 
Third, changes in the geographical origin of patents provide evidence for the increase in 
patent applications. The fastest growth has been observed for patents whose assignees 
are from Asia. For example, Korean firms such as Samsung and LG are among those with 
the most patent applications to the European Patent Office.  
Finally, additional factors include the firm’s experience in patenting (i.e. the number of 
patents filed in previous years), the number of inventors involved in the patent 
application and the number of classes according to the International Patent 
Classification2 (van Zeebroeck et al., 2006). 
                                                
 
 
1 The Patent Cooperation Treaty is an international patent law treaty, concluded in 1970. It provides a unified 
procedure for filing patent applications to protect inventions in each of its Contracting States. A patent 
application filed under this treaty is called an international application or PCT application. 
2 The International Patent Classification, established by the Strasbourg Agreement 1971, provides a hierarchical 
system of language independent symbols for the classification of patents and utility models according to the 
different areas of technology to which they pertain. 
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Transatlantic patent count behaviour: 
A much greater number of patents are granted in the United States than in Europe 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2002; European 
Commission, 2002). This difference has already been explained by others as follows. 
First, examiners at the United States Patent Office are encouraged by monetary 
bonuses to grant patent applications, a policy that has the unsettling effect of 
rewarding examiners for quickly pushing patents through the patent office. 
Specifically, each patent examiner receives a salary bonus based on how many final 
allowances or rejections of a patent he or she authorises. Because a rejection can be 
challenged and may not become final for quite some time, it is easier to receive a 
bonus by allowing patents (Merges, 1999). 
Second, a backlog in the granting procedure at the European Patent Office (Abbott, 
2004) means many applications are still pending. 
Third, the European Patent Office employs higher standards than the United States 
Patent Office, as shown by applications in the biotechnology domain that are made in 
the United States but not in Europe, or by some applications made in Europe, where 
the American counterpart has been granted, that are then refused or withdrawn from 
the European procedure or revoked after opposition (Verbeure et al. 2006). 
Fourth, it should be noted that these different forms of claims may not be all present 
in a single patent as official patent regulations in certain countries may require them 
to be divided into two or more separate patent applications. For instance, a product 
claim on the nucleic acid sequence and a product claim on a protein sequence can 
occur in the same European patent, whereas two different patents have to be filed for 
each type of product claim in the United States (Verbeure et al. 2006). 
2.3 What is new 
‘It is true that the London Agreement has reduced the cost for validating European 
patents, as the patentee no longer needs to file translations of the entire text of the 
granted patent, but only the claims. We are still waiting for more states to join, but when 
they have, it will become significantly less costly to validate patents. It will be interesting 
to see how patentees will use the money saved. Some may validate their granted patents 
in more contracting states, thus using the saved money to pay more renewal fees. 
Others may increase their filing activity, and yet others may divert the savings to other 
areas altogether. While the increase in validations per patent would not negatively affect 
the backlog of the patent offices and might even provide the offices with increased 
funding from validation and renewal fees, we will probably see some increase in filings as 
a result of the London Agreement as well. It is still a bit too early to say how big the 
effect will be’, says Schwarze (Zacco, 2008). 
To the question of whether the European Patent Office has the political will and the ability 
to grant more patents in pace with the rising demand, Dunlop (2008) points out that the 
European Patent Office allowance rate has fallen over the past ten years, from nearly 
70% in 1996 to about 52% in 2007. He provides plausible explanations of the fall, which 
include: 
 poorer quality of patent applications (e.g. more patent applications chasing the 
same number of inventions or briefer descriptions); 
 raising of the bar at the European Patent Office (for inventive step, sufficiency of 
disclosure and prohibition on added matter); 
IP/A/STOA/2009-01 13 PE 424.763
STOA - Science and Technology Options Assessment 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 growing backlog of applications awaiting oral proceedings (i.e. if easy cases are 
being granted and difficult cases are stacking up waiting for oral proceedings). 
The number of patent applications in the State Intellectual Property Office of China rose 
from 100,000 in 2003 to 175,000 in 2005, a sign that the country has realised the 
importance of patents. While the total number of applications to the European Patent 
Office from China remains small (roughly 5,000 compared to 27,000 from the United 
States), most experts believe that Chinese applications will soon make up a much larger 
portion. In preparation, the European Patent Office has already intensified cooperation 
with China. Harmonisation and cooperation are crucial for dealing with the backlog issue. 
The Utilisation Pilot Project is a 12-month initiative to test whether the European Patent 
Office can use search work carried out by national patent offices on the same application. 
This pilot project is being carried out in the framework of the newly established European 
Patent Network, a strategic cooperation scheme involving the European Patent Office and 
the national patent offices. As patents are increasingly marketed globally, there exists a 
logical trend towards the harmonisation of patent laws. In this respect, the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation launched the Substantive Patent Law Treaty, a 
proposed international patent law treaty aimed at harmonising substantive points of 
patent law, such as novelty, inventive step, industrial applicability and utility, as well as 
sufficient disclosure, unity of invention, claim drafting and interpretation (EPO, 2008). It 
is worth mentioning that these discussions are in a deadlock and nothing concrete might 
be reasonably expected from these negotiations. In particular, the five biggest patent 
offices (United States, Japan, Europe, China and South Korea) are already trying to 
handle backlogs (European Patent Office, 2008b). 
The Administrative Council backed a plan setting out how the European Patent Office 
should tackle its growing workload. The study was prepared by the so-called Board 28, 
which was appointed by the Council, following discussion with the President Ms Alison 
Brimelow and her staff. It contained recommendations on how the European Patent 
Office and national offices should deal with growing numbers of patent applications and 
increasing backlogs, as well as ensuring quality standards of European patents. The 
study recommends that the European Patent Office: 
 utilises work done by others (by both patent offices in Europe and outside, and by 
applicants and third parties); 
 raises the bar for patent granting so as to grant exclusive rights only for technical 
innovations with sufficient inventive merit; 
 improves efficiency; 
 boosts cooperation within Europe (for example, by building the European Patent 
Network);  
 improves the  ability to deal with new challenges, and reviewing governance and 
finance issues. 
 
2.4 Policy implications 
The evidence against a growing backlog is not conclusive, but comfort can be found in 
the Administrative Council Survey, which indicates that the production at the European 
Patent Office is growing faster than its incoming workload. The Survey consider three 
scenarios for the next decade and anticipates that except in a scenario of extreme 
growth, the programme of recruitment, building and training at the European Patent 
Office will more than cope with the demand (Dunlop, 2008). 
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According to van Pottelsberghe (2007), the workload of the European Patent Office will 
probably continue to increase in the future due to the following factors: 
 First, the improved integration of the European market for technology through the 
London Protocol (based on the London Agreement) or the European Patent 
Litigation Agreement, might improve the attractiveness of the European Patent 
Office.  
 Second, fast developing countries (e.g. India and China) might cause a potentially 
sharp increase in patent filings originating from these nations.  
 Third, universities and public research institutes as new assignees might have an 
increased propensity to patent their inventions. 
Strategic initiatives have been envisaged to deal with the fact that patent applications 
continue to enter the European Patent Office’s examining divisions at a faster rate than 
the rate at which the examining divisions can dispose of them. 
According to Schwarze (Zacco, 2008): ‘one of the proposed solutions to the increasing 
workload problem of the European Patent Office has been to use the resources of the 
national patent offices to perform search or examination tasks, that is to outsource the 
work to national patent offices. However, this suggestion has been met with concerns 
from users who worry whether the European Patent Office can maintain its high level of 
quality of granted patents. Even some contracting states have raised concerns; they 
have stated that they have given patent granting authority to the European Patent Office, 
but that this did not involve giving patent granting authority to national patent offices in 
other countries. As opposed to this, some other offices are actively seeking work in a 
drive to increase their income and maintain local expertise. It is evident that these 
diverging opinions complicate the search for an agreement. ‘ 
Another recommended answer is the patent prosecution highway, adds Schwarze (Zacco, 
2008): ‘The idea behind the patent prosecution highway is that national patent offices 
benefit from each other’s work, in particular from their search results. For example, once 
an applicant has received an allowance from the patent office of the first filing, 
corresponding applications in other offices may under certain conditions be fast-tracked. 
While the idea of reuse of work is to be welcomed in order to reduce backlogs, the devil 
lies as always in the detail. For example, this system will only work efficiently if the first-
filing office prosecutes the application fast, as the other offices need to wait for the 
outcome of this examination. One should bear in mind that there already exists a well-
established and very good system of work-sharing, namely the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty system [...] And one wonders whether a further development of the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty system might not be a more efficient way forward. However, we will 
have to wait and see whether the patent prosecution highway attracts the interest of 
applicants and proves a useful tool.’ 
To sum up, the backlog problem is not new and has not been unaddressed. Backlogs can 
be caused by an increase in the number of patent applications and patent size. A large 
number of patents granted could be explained by patent examiners’ bonuses, legal and 
cultural contexts, claim forms, the geographical origin of patents, a firm’s experience in 
patenting, the number of inventors involved in the patent application, and the number of 
patent classes involved in the application. An increase in the size of patents might be 
caused by the filing route choice, sector idiosyncrasies, and filing strategy. In order to 
tackle the backlog issue, the Administrative Council of the European Patent Office has 
been advised to follow strategic lines of enquiry.  
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3 THE ENHANCEMENT OF PATENT AWARENESS WITHIN 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
3.1 Problématique 
The European Parliament acts more and more as a co-legislator in the field of Intellectual 
Property (IP) (directive on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, discussions 
relating to the Directive on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions). Once 
the Lisbon Treaty becomes effective, the European Parliament will be de jure co-legislator 
for all legislative initiatives in the field of IP. In addition, issues related to IP are of 
interest for different committees such as JURI, IMCO, ITRE (for the technical and 
economic aspects), REGI (for the regional aspects of IP), and INTA (IP chapters in the 
Free Trade Agreements). The issue treated here deals with the reason and the way for 
improving competences and awareness of EP on IP aspects. The first point presented is 
the need of developing a European strategy on IP. 
A well-functioning and legitimate patent system is of uppermost importance for a 
knowledge-based economy. It sustains R&D, innovation, market penetration and welfare 
and it requires a strategy. While Japan and the US have developed their strategy and 
elevated IP issues to the highest political level, the European Union is still lagging behind. 
Improvement of the European patent system requires strengthening the role and 
expertise of the European Parliament in patent-related issues and accommodating the 
rise in public interest in patent matters (Cowan et al., 2007). European Union IP policy 
making is too fragmented and disconnected from other issues (competition, trade etc.); 
both insight and evidence-based IP policy is lacking.   
Some of the reasons and options for improving patent awareness among Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) include: 
Why (reasons) 
 The role of the European Parliament in guiding and monitoring the European 
patent system is growing. 
 The European patent system is increasingly large and complex, reflecting the ‘pro-
patent era’ (Kortum and Lerner, 1999) or ‘intellectual capitalism’ (Granstrand, 
1999), and it needs both standard rules and flexibility to deal with different 
national/regional contexts, increasingly differentiated applications by technological 
fields, rising problems of coordination for promoting trans-national collaborations, 
etc. 
 New kinds of problem come with the extension of the IP system: quantity vs. 
quality, private vs. social benefits (knowledge circulation and access), 
overcrowding and overlapping sets of rights in specific research areas etc. 
 Ongoing reform of the European patent system needs to be managed and 
monitored because the political thrust towards unification is facing important 
challenges: the harmonisation of national patent regulations in the EU, the 
possible creation of an EU-wide Community Patent, the expansion and reform of 
the European Patent Convention, etc. 
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 Public interest in the IP system has grown: intellectual property rights (IPR) 
systems now attract attention, not only among the users of the respective IPR 
systems, but also more broadly among European citizens. Recent developments 
have led to intense debates and controversies as to how IPR should be designed 
(Harhoff, 2006). Examples of such controversies in Europe include: the debates 
on copyright and digital rights management systems,  the protection of computer 
software through patents  or copyrights, and the extent of patent protection for 
biotechnological innovations.  
 Some of the renewed interest is created by the perception that over the last 
decades, IPR systems have strengthened the position of rights owners over those 
of the users of protected subject matter (Harhoff, 2006). 
How (options) 
 MEPs' awareness could be improved by ensuring greater competence in patent 
matters through three kinds of tools:  
- use of IPR advisers by MEPs, and procuring studies and inquiries to deal with 
broader economic and social questions arising from trends and practices within 
the patent system;   
- information on EPO Council decisions; 
    - regular consultations between MEPs and IPR system users and stakeholders. 
3.2 What we already know 
The background document for the STOA Workshop held in June 2007 underlines that 
transparency and participation are fundamental in activities related to the European 
patent system. One of the main challenges is ensuring an increased level of transparency 
and political accountability. First and foremost, this involves strengthening the role and 
expertise of the European Parliament in this field, given that it is a critical participant in 
these sorts of discussions. The other main challenge is trying to accommodate the rise in 
public interest and wish for involvement of civil society at large in matters concerning the 
European patent system. 
Complexity, extension and changes to the European Patent System are among the 
reasons for the need to improve MEPs’ awareness: 
 The IPR system is complex since it is the result of specific laws, administrative 
practices and court interventions. 
 Changes in technology require changes in the design of IPR systems and pose 
important challenges to existing institutions, to policy makers and to the public. 
 Patent systems are under pressure: patent applications and patents granted at 
the EPO have increased much faster (7.4% per year) than R&D inputs in OECD 
countries (3.4% per year). 
 Patent costs in Europe are also a major policy concern (from three to five times 
the cost of patenting in USA or in Japan). These costs are not affordable by SMEs. 
The London Protocol should contribute to lowering the patenting costs in Europe, 
but then a quality-oriented patent policy will become a ‘must’.  
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The market for technology is growing: the traditional view is that knowledge is difficult to 
transfer by markets, since its value depends on a large number of complementary assets 
in the hands of different individuals. Asymmetric information between suppliers and 
those who are seeking information or assets is another reason, but recently new 
intermediaries are pushing the market of ideas and disembodied technologies.  
Several private equity backed funds in Europe purchase IPR and combine them to 
valuable portfolios that can be sold or licensed to potential users. IPR have been used in 
some cases as collateral for loans to SMES (Harhoff D, 2006).  
In knowledge-based economies, modes of generation, appropriation, access, diffusion 
and distribution of knowledge (in science and technology) have become decisive for 
societal development and important areas of political debate. 
The European patent system is characterised by technocratic decision-making. It lacks 
democratic legitimacy and accountability and has become increasingly inefficient 
(Schneider, 2006). The EU and the EPO are two worlds apart: they are two fully-
independent supranational bodies and the EPO is not subject to EU and EC decisions 
The EPO’s self-governance is mainly based on the interaction between applicants and the 
EPO itself, and between granting departments and Boards of Appeal (quasi-judiciary 
bodies). 
The EPO is an institution that is self-funded by the fees of patentees. The interests of 
parties other than the applicants are not represented, and there is the risk of capture by 
the applicants, who can be seen as customers to be served. Moreover, its limits for 
patent eligibility are expanding, it covers a broad scope of patents to be granted, and it 
demands a low threshold for inventive step. All these pose problems of patent quality, 
but also of power. There are two critical aspects: the inherent expansionist drive and the 
fact that innovation has to be qualified in terms of efficiency, sustainability and social 
desirability. 
Questions of the separation of powers, accountability, democracy, legitimacy and control 
are of utmost importance. It may be necessary to re-balance the governance of the 
patent system, introducing more roles for the European Union, increased 
democratisation, legislative regulation of substantive patent law in new technological 
fields and improving the responsiveness of the European Parliament on IPR issues in the 
following areas: 
 Public domain or ‘Open’ science 
 Ethical limits 
 Public health and cost issues 
 Efficiency 
 Alternative modes of innovation (e.g. Open Source). 
By institutionalising the scanning of applications and grants of patents, patent 
information could be used as an early warning system for policy makers. This, in turn, 
may better inform regulators linked to, but outside, the European patent system. 
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3.3 What is new 
The effectiveness and legitimacy of IPR systems are under scrutiny. If the innovation 
process is a social process, then the patent system is ultimately related to the 
sustainability of its social contract (Borrás, 2006). 
The reflexive self-regulation of the EPO could be combined with mechanisms for greater 
responsiveness, including appropriate venues for legislative decision making and 
feedback loops with society. It may be desirable to strengthen the interface between the 
EU and the EPO through the following: 
 qualitative reporting by the EPO on its practices, which can make implicit policy 
explicit (opening the black box); 
 acknowledgement of the EPO’s limits of competence as an executive body, 
requesting advisory support by national and EU legislators, and by the ECJ; 
 systematic use of patent information for regulatory activities outside of patent law 
(e.g. health, environment, anti-trust, etc.). 
MEPs need to improve their competence and expand their role. This can be achieved by 
creating positions for advisers and using advisory actions on complex issues, such as the 
impact of the European patent system on innovation and society. Advisers can flag up 
the potentially important developments, which may have an impact on economic and 
social issues and thus need further investigation. IP advisory activity needs 
multidisciplinary expertise in law, economics, social sciences and patent-related matters. 
Advisory action is a “feasible” solution, since, as we understood, other proposals such as 
an internal EP body, are too complex and less feasible. 
The European Parliament can also set up temporary Committees and Committees of 
Inquiry when matters of political importance require it. These suggested committees 
could work for a set period of time with a defined mandate.  
MEPs need also to have consultations with various practitioners and stakeholders, such 
as consumer groups, to identify challenges that may crop up and ways to deal with them 
and this can be done by hearings on specific topics, round-table meetings or Internet 
discussion forums. 
 
3.4 Policy implications 
Effectiveness and legitimacy are two inseparable issues for the success of governance 
systems.  
Effectiveness deals with the quality of the output, the quality of IP and the use of both. 
Legitimacy deals with the balance between individual and social welfare, appropriation 
and the rules of dissemination (Borrás, 2006). The patent system is a concrete 
mechanism that seeks to generate an output by granting specific rights to actors and 
coordinating their interactions in different but interconnected contexts (regulatory and 
judicial spheres, market and product competition, technological dynamics). The 
importance of non-hierarchical network-based forms of coordination, under which 
different types of actors interact and cooperate, is growing. 
IP/A/STOA/2009-01 19 PE 424.763
STOA - Science and Technology Options Assessment 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The concept of network governance success, which looks at the formal and informal 
dimensions of interactions in systems, could be explored as a possible analytical 
framework for assessing if the governance of the IP system is successful. While an 
improvement in EP capacity of dealing with IP question is seen as a quality issue, the 
network governance is proposed for answering to the legitimacy aspect of governance. It 
is not contradictory, it is currently implemented also by EPO and it deals with the need of 
implementing flows of information and loci of participation. Network governance 
examples are the existing experience by EPO in forums, public hearings and open 
consultation. These involve mainly IP users and we suggest opening to a more diversified 
range of stakeholders. 
A key aspect of the legitimacy of formal interaction in the European patent system is that 
it depends on national parliaments and on the European Parliament actively discussing 
matters and holding national representatives accountable for the functioning of the 
system. In the case of the European patent system this can be problematic, given its 
legal-technical and technological nature. Notwithstanding this, national parliaments and 
the European Parliament have been very active in recent years (in the areas of 
biotechnology and software patents). Nevertheless, the engagement of parliaments in 
the political debate is only one side of the question. Other dimensions are to be 
considered and improved, including the following: 
 The ability of parliaments to scrutinise whether decisions are correctly 
implemented by the regulatory agencies, particularly by the EPO. This is still an 
open matter in the European patent system, which depends mostly on national 
parliaments’ scrutiny via their respective national representatives of all matters 
concerning the EPO, rather than to scrutiny by the European Parliament, which 
concerns only EU-harmonised legislation and has no direct power over the EPO 
(Borrás, 2006). 
 The effectiveness of the informal interactions that take place in the patent system, 
sometimes involving a large range of stakeholders. ‘Today there is a strong 
epistemic community of technical experts in these matters in Europe, which is 
generally formed by legal professionals who meet regularly in a wide range of 
forums’ (Borrás, 2006). The EPO is creating and sponsoring some of these 
forums, such as SACEPO and EURO-TAB. The EPO is also opening up to users 
through public hearings and open consultations, but these initiatives are focused 
on the users’ viewpoint, and there are ‘popular fears of the EPO being captured by 
large patenting firms’ (Borrás, 2006). The chance of enhancing the general 
acceptance and legitimacy of the system is still limited. 
The overall success of the governance of the European patent system could be better 
assured by creating a more diversified set of formal and informal mechanisms of 
legitimacy, expanding or creating new forums for dialogue with a wider range of 
representation, combining experts and non experts and opening the learning process.  
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4 PATENT ENFORCEMENT 
4.1 Problématique 
A major concern for patent applicants is the potential cost of patent enforcement in legal 
disputes (Bessen and Meurer, 2008). Litigation costs include court costs, fees for 
lawyers, patent attorneys and experts, costs of witnesses, technical investigations and 
costs related to appeals. The threat of being involved in a costly and uncertain 
infringement case, as well as the risk of retaliation, can negatively affect ex ante 
research and development (R&D) incentives, particularly for less financially endowed 
companies. Moreover, when a patent right is not credibly enforceable its private value 
vanishes and potential infringers have an incentive to act opportunistically. 
In recent years, a number of studies have highlighted an increase in patent disputes both 
in Europe and the United States. Despite the growing number of patent suits, the number 
of cases terminating during or after the case has gone to court has been stable through 
time (Bessen and Meurer, 2005), which suggests an increasing role for extrajudicial 
settlements. Scholars are questioning whether the direct and indirect costs associated 
with enforcing patent rights are imposing an implicit tax on innovation in vital segments 
of the economy (e.g. Barton, 2000; Jaffe & Lerner, 2004; Hall and Ziedonis, 2007). 
While the negative impact of excessive litigation has been largely identified, the policy 
action for the enhancement of patent enforceability within the European patent system 
has to face additional constraints relating to European institutional arrangements. 
Currently, an infringed patent holder has to defend its European patent across all 
jurisdictions in which the patent right has been granted, with an inevitable explosion in 
legal costs as well as in time-to-market opportunity costs.  
Below, we show data on legal costs for patent infringement cases across European 
countries, although the additional implicit costs related to delayed access to final product 
markets are difficult to estimate. However, some recent estimates in the pharmaceutical 
sector highlight considerable variations between member states in the duration of patent 
litigation proceedings, with an average value of 2.8 years (European Commission, 
2008b). In technological contexts characterised by rapid product obsolescence such 
lengthy procedures might represent a significant disincentive to R&D investments  
Moreover, the various European national court systems are characterised by significant 
variations in the procedures adopted for handling patent cases. With respect to this 
situation, the urgent need for policy interventions devoted to fostering access to the 
patent system by guaranteeing higher enforceability is witnessed by the communication 
of the European Commission on the enhancement of the European patent system 
(European Commission, 2007a). Despite the harmonisation of procedures and remedies 
in the field of IPR infringements under the Enforcement Directive (European Parliament 
and Council, 2004), there are still important differences in national procedures and 
practices due to non-harmonised aspects of the collection of factual evidence, cross-
examinations, hearings and the role of experts 
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4.2 What we already know 
The literature has investigated the determinants and dynamics of patent infringements 
(Bessen and Meurer, 2005 and 2006; Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004; Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004; Lemley and Allison, 1998; Somaya, 2003). Most of these studies 
support the existence of a negative effect from patent litigation that tends to limit the 
innovation incentives for smaller firms operating in specific technological domains 
characterised by high-patenting rates, such as biotechnology. For small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs), those constraints turn out to be more binding in industries with 
complex products; for instance, the information and communication technology (ICT) 
sector, in which the degree of opacity of the technologies covered by patents is higher 
and their actual coverage is less clear. The extensive survey data from R&D managers 
presented in Cohen et al. (2000) shows that the most prominent motives for patenting in 
technologically complex industries (e.g. biotechnology and ICT) include the prevention of 
lawsuits and the use of patents in licence negotiations. 
The perception of limited enforceability of intellectual property rights might have a 
negative impact on individual or academic inventors. For example, Shane and Somaya 
(2007), using secondary data on licensing and interviews with technology licensing office 
(TLO) directors of research universities, find both qualitative and quantitative evidence 
that patent litigation has an adverse effect on university licensing activity. This adverse 
effect occurs because litigation disrupts overall TLO activity and reduces the time and 
resources available for commercialising technologies and formalising licences.    
A report commissioned by the European Commission (European Commission, 2006b) 
provides the most up-to-date estimates. The incidence of litigation and related legal costs 
vary significantly across Member States. Germany turns out to play a prominent role, 
accounting for half the litigation carried out in the EU, with a ratio of actions to patents of 
1 in 300. In France, the ratio is 1 in 5000 and in the United Kingdom 1 in 2000, while 
most other Member States fall somewhere between these two. With respect to legal 
costs, the United Kingdom, Germany and Finland appear to be the most expensive 
countries for litigation, first instance costs to judgment being respectively €550,000, 
€300,000 and €240,000. While in France, Italy and Belgium, those costs are around 
€70,000. It is important to stress that such figures are likely to increase significantly 
when appeals are taken into account as well. The report also provides estimates about 
the expected litigation costs before a unified European Patent Court. Such costs would 
vary between €97,000 and €415,000 at first instance and between €83,000 and 
€220,000 at second instance. Hence, the cost for defending a patent extended to three 
Member States is estimated on average between 10% and 45% less than the cost of 
today’s parallel litigation at first instance and between 11% and 43% at second instance. 
The figures reported above show how the risk of incurring a patent dispute can seriously 
deter patenting incentives for SMEs, institutions and individual inventors. The data on the 
incidence of actual disputes per granted active patent, which might appear at first glance 
to be relatively small, need to be carefully interpreted. In fact, most patent infringement 
cases are eventually solved through extrajudicial settlements, whose conditions are not 
observable. Although the use of extrajudicial negotiations and licensing has positive 
welfare implications (since both parties save legal costs), concerns have been raised 
when the relative bargaining power of the parties are highly asymmetrical. For example, 
when SMEs are sued by large incumbents or when companies adopt strategic patenting 
behaviours explicitly aimed at extracting high royalties. 
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Several studies have contributed to shedding light on these aspects. Firstly, Cremers 
(2004) provides an empirical analysis using data from 714 patent infringement suits filed 
at two of the three main district courts in Germany (Mannheim and Düsseldorf). Results 
strongly support the hypotheses that the expected patent value has a positive and 
significant impact on the probability of litigation. Furthermore, patents which survived an 
opposition procedure have a higher probability of being litigated against. Individuals face 
a smaller probability of being involved in patent suits while small firms have the highest 
risk of litigation. Second, Harhoff and Reitzig (2004), after analysing a sample of more 
than 13,000 EPO patents in biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors, report that an 
opposition is filed in 8.6% of the cases. The empirical evidence demonstrate that the 
likelihood of opposition increases with patent value (estimated from the number of 
citations from subsequent patents that a specific patent receives after its grant date), 
and that opposition is particularly frequent in areas with strong patenting activity and 
high technological or market uncertainty.  
The patent was revoked in 30.5% and amended in 40.6% of the opposition cases. Third, 
similar findings are reported by Calderini and Scellato (2004) for the ICT sector in 
Europe. In this area, there is an incidence of opposition of 5%. Among opposed patents, 
nearly 35% are eventually revoked while in 22% of the cases the patent claims are 
amended. Furthermore, the data on oppositions in the ICT sector reveals an almost 
negligible number of cases where both plaintiff and defendant are drawn from the main 
incumbents in the field. This might indicate that under the credible risk of possible 
retaliations, large companies are able to achieve cross-licensing agreements with each 
other, while adopting more aggressive behaviour against smaller patent holders. Finally, 
Lanjouw and Lerner (2001) find that the use of preliminary injunctions by large firms 
discourages R&D by small firms. 
 
4.3 What is new 
Patent litigation insurance has long been considered a potentially powerful tool for 
ensuring access to the patent system for SMEs, which do not have extensive legal 
resources and are put off from developing, patenting or litigating patents on new 
technologies owing to the expense and complexities in the European patent system. 
Patent litigation insurance can take the form of defensive policies or offensive policies, 
which in some cases can be combined. Defensive policies are also known as ‘patent 
infringement defence insurance’ or ‘patent liability insurance’ and indemnify the 
subscriber for the legal fees and expenses required to defend an action for revocation of 
one of his patent rights, following unintentional infringement of someone else’s patent. 
Offensive policies, also known as ‘pursuit policies’, become active when someone else 
infringes the subscriber’s patent. 
Despite the potential beneficial impact of such insurance schemes, different analyses 
(European Commission, 2006b) have highlighted how patent litigation insurance has not 
been particularly successful. There seems to be a scenario whereby high levels of 
premiums and relatively low indemnities do not provide adequate coverage. 
Nevertheless, different studies have identified through extensive interviews with patent-
oriented companies and patent attorneys a strong interest in the establishment of an 
effective patent litigation insurance system. 
Several factors have contributed to the very limited growth of the industry. First, patents 
are assets whose risk assessment represents a difficult and expensive task. Second, trial 
durations and corresponding costs are highly volatile.  
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Third, insurers stress the risk of inducing opportunistic behaviours among insured firms; 
filing suits against competitors’ patents, even if not infringing, can temporarily block their 
innovations. Finally, the risk of adversely selecting the portfolio of subscribers is regarded 
as being very high because of the absence of a regime of compulsory pursuit policies. 
Some scholars have studied patent litigation insurance. For example, Llobet and Suarez 
(2006) show that a competitive insurance market should be able to provide patent 
litigation insurance policies tailored to the characteristics of each innovator (as the 
optimal deductible and premium depend on innovation-specific parameters), while 
making them compulsory might imply imposing the same policy on all patent holders. 
Hence, governments should simply focus on facilitating the existence of the market. 
Regarding compulsory insurance as a solution to adverse selection risk, the discussion 
led by Buzzacchi and Scellato (2008) raises some relevant concerns. They show that the 
strategic value of the insurance is related to the possibility for the insured patent holder 
to deter entry by imitators, making litigation more credible, and increasing the 
bargaining power in case of settlement. However, the most interesting result pertains to 
the fact that even in a context of perfect discrimination and a competitive insurance 
market, only a sub-sample of innovators would find it profitable to acquire the insurance. 
Furthermore, given the high heterogeneity across industries in the rate of litigation, a 
compulsory insurance scheme would implicitly generate a form of cross-subsidisation 
from patentees operating in sectors characterised by low probability of litigation to those 
patentees operating in high-risk technological domains. Finally, the identification of an 
appropriate system of co-payments to discourage the insured from opportunistic 
behaviour and a contingent explosion in patent litigations appears to be a difficult task. 
Two exhaustive studies by the European Commission have addressed the issue of patent 
litigation insurance. Insurers, brokers and industry representatives have been consulted 
in order to understand the feasibility of these types of insurance schemes. It has been 
reported that patentees will insure their patents if the premium and conditions are 
reasonable (between €300 and €600). Without compulsion, no currently envisaged 
scheme is likely to succeed. Although it may be possible to move back to a voluntary 
scheme later, once a scheme is well established, only a mandatory scheme can generate 
benefits (European Commission, 2006b). 
An additional route to sustaining patent enforceability by SMEs might consist of favouring 
the establishment of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) systems and encouraging, if not 
requiring, parties to engage in mediation, conciliation or arbitration prior to seeking 
judicial remedies. The critical points are that they are voluntary processes, they require 
cooperation of partners and that the settlement should be binding. Kingston (2001) 
provides a detailed assessment of most of the critical issues of the patent system with 
regard to litigation and enforcement.  
As far as expert arbitration is concerned, the WIPO has set up arrangements for 
arbitration of disputes (WIPO, 2008). But this has rarely been used because arbitration is 
voluntary and used only when both parties agree on it as a way of settling their dispute. 
Moreover, such agreement reflects comparable levels of economic strength. Arbitration is 
not used when the cost of litigation intimidates a weaker party to obtain justice. 
Nevertheless this type of approach to dispute resolution might represent an effective tool 
at least for a sub sample of cases jointly involving smaller firms. 
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Apart from that, the draft European Patent Litigation Agreement (EPLA) aims to establish 
a uniform jurisdiction for European patents. The intention is to create a unified system 
for litigation on European patents for those EPC contracting parties that wish to join the 
system (EPO, 2006).  
 
4.4 Policy implications 
The results of the large pan-European consultation launched by the European 
Commission in 2006 stress the urgent need for policy actions to provide ‘a simple, cost-
effective and high quality one-stop-shop patent system in Europe, both for examination 
and grant as well as post-grant procedures, including litigation’ (European Commission, 
2006a).  
Given such a premise, it is clear that the improvement of the enforceability of patents 
should be a priority within the policy agenda dealing with the governance of the 
European patent system. The identification of appropriate policy options requires a 
preliminary in-depth understanding of the driving forces of the patent litigation 
phenomenon, as well as of the trade-offs related to specific policy interventions.  
The joint analysis of the current available data and economic studies seems to highlight a 
set of relevant policy directions. 
First, there is substantial convergence on the positive expected impact of the 
establishment of a unified jurisdiction for European patents. While concerns have been 
raised relating to the potential increase in translation costs during proceedings (which 
would negatively affect enforceability by SMEs), the data and the economic literature 
stress two points: from an aggregate perspective the establishment of a specialised court 
with trained judges will significantly deter opportunistic behaviours by patentees who 
pursue strategic patenting conducts, while the increase in expected litigation costs will be 
significant only for those patentees that are now extending their rights to a very limited 
number of Member States. The establishment of a uniform European jurisdiction would 
have an additional non-negligible positive effect with respect to any future process 
towards redefinition of the international laws governing the relationships between 
national patent systems, including the ongoing process of definition of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).   
Second, the introduction of a more effective litigation system cannot substitute for 
policies aimed at improving patent quality. The data on the patent litigation explosion in 
the United States, where a federal district court to deal with patent proceedings was 
established in the 1980s, show how the two-policy approach is strictly complementary. 
An improvement in the efficiency of the granting process can also be achieved by an 
enhanced partnership between the national patent offices of Member States and the EPO, 
while maintaining a high quality of patent rights. This can be achieved in particular by 
more efficient use of technical expertise to avoid unnecessary duplication of work or by 
optimal use of all resources. In this perspective is important to recall that in 2007 the 
European Council made a draft proposal for the general provision of the future 
Community patent. The improvement of the future capability of European SMEs to access 
and exploit the IP will depend on the completion of such legislative process. 
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Concerning the institution of a unified jurisdiction for patent cases in Europe, in 2009 the 
European Council published a revised draft statute for a European Patent Court (Council 
of the European Union, 2009). According to the draft, a Court of First Instance shall 
comprise a central division as well as local and regional divisions, upon Contracting 
States’ request, when more than one hundred patent cases per calendar year have been 
commenced in that Contracting State. The Court shall comprise both legally qualified 
judges and technically qualified judges. The European Community and the Contracting 
States which are not Member States shall provide initial financial contributions necessary 
for the setting up of the Court. Concerning language arrangements during proceedings, 
which has been a major issue restraining the set up of a unified patent court, the draft 
statute states that parties will have to opportunity to agree on the language to be used in 
the legal proceedings and that the Court shall provide interpretation facilities to assist the 
parties concerned at oral proceedings. The future effective implementation of such a 
proposal might have profound positive impacts on patent enforceability in Europe, also 
for smaller patentees.  
Third, public support for the creation and development of an insurance market for the 
coverage of litigation costs does not seem to be a viable and effective policy option. 
Public interventions in these specific fields bring an elevated risk of inducing undesired 
effects, including implicit cross-subsidisations from low-risk patentees to high-risk 
patentees and a potential increase in litigation rates.   
Finally, public support for the establishment and diffusion of alternative forms of dispute 
resolution appears to be important. In particular, the experience of the WIPO arbitration 
and mediation system suggests that the opportunity exists to sustain the diffusion of this 
type of cost effective resolution system among European firms. 
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5 REGIONAL DIMENSION OF IP IN EUROPE 
5.1 Problématique 
A specific and growing role of regions in Europe is the management of the relation 
between university and industry at local or regional level, where innovation can be “user 
driven”. A relevant aspect of these relations deals with the transfer of knowledge from 
university to industrial companies, which can be managed through selling and licensing 
academic patents to industry. These activities can be managed directly by Universities 
and can be supported by regional policy (incentives for developing transfer office within 
or externally to Universities); moreover there is an increasing role of regional and local 
technology parks. Recent changes in the national legislation recognised the possibility of 
University to be entitled to IPRs on their patentable research results and this enlarge 
their involvement in knowledge transfer to the market. Regions can be the broker of 
academic IPRs or can support the university-industry relations through policy of network 
building. In the following the relevance and the problems of this regional dimension of 
IPRs are presented.  
As far as regional dimension is concerned, we make clear reference in this chapter to the 
EU “place based “policy, to the EU “regional policy”, to the EU “cohesion policy” and to its 
improved content of innovation and competitiveness, therefore also on IP aspects.  
This is a time of ‘opportunities that are being created by changes both in the way 
business is undertaking research and development (R&D) and in the way that universities 
are opening their doors to new forms of collaboration with business partners’ (Lambert, 
2003). The biggest challenges in many European countries in this respect are on the 
demand side, since often businesses are not research intensive and their R&D activities 
are not impressive. In some countries (such as Italy, but also Germany) the industrial 
population is mainly formed by SMEs, whose specialisation can be far from the public 
research institutions’ interest and which are often strongly dependent on the local 
context. Moreover, SMEs are not aware enough of the role of IPR for their innovation and 
growth, while Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and public research organisations 
(PROs), notwithstanding changes in their attitude towards involvement in economic 
growth aspects, are rarely oriented towards local problems. Finally, even if important 
reforms related to the technology transfer mission of HEIs are ongoing in European 
countries, organisations, incentives and regulation of the so called third mission of the 
public research institutions are different; consequently targeted, local-based policies are 
necessary, together with some European-level guidelines, e.g. towards HEIs and PROs IP 
management. All of this implies a role for public regional authorities.  
The argument will take the following path: 
 First, the recognition of a relevant role for place-based policy within the efforts to 
build a European Research Area (ERA). 
 Second, the recent changes on the HEIs and PROs transfer mission in Europe and 
the identification of a key problem in the pathway from increased patent-based 
codification of research results towards transformation into commercial products. 
 Third what specific role can be played by regional policy in fostering the use of 
public research results? 
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The European Commission recognises a role for regions in the European Research Area 
(European Commission,2001a): regions emerge as dynamic players in developing and 
structuring ERA through focused efforts (i.e. a tailor-made research policy addressing 
specific territorial conditions, tuning national policy to the socio-economic needs of 
regions). It also recognises that the research and innovation policies autonomously 
developed by many European regions, while being in tune with their national 
counterparts, point to a new development model for the organisation of European 
research and innovation systems that is region-conscious. This involves targeting 
economic development through a systemic mobilisation of all resources available in 
regions towards concrete goals. The regional dimension of research, technology and 
innovation policy allows the exploitation of comparative advantage at regional level, while 
some more successful regions engage in innovative experiments in cross-border 
cooperation. 
The efforts of regions in the ‘ERA should have two clear objectives, both with a distinct 
value-added for European research and innovation policies: first to stimulate the uptake 
of research results into the local socio-economic fabric (especially vis-à-vis SMEs) and 
second to increase public and private investment in research and innovation in the 
regions’. 
Some regional actions were considered eligible for co-funding at European level 
(European Commission, 2001a), such as: 
 the creation or reinforcement of cooperation networks between firms, public 
research organisations (PROs), financial institutions etc.; 
 staff exchange between public and private organisations; 
 the dissemination of research results and technological adaptation within SMEs; 
 the establishment of technological strategies for the region, including pilot 
projects; 
 support for incubators for new enterprises with links to university and PROs and 
encouragement for spin-offs from universities or large companies; 
 schemes for assisting science and technology (S&T) projects carried out jointly by 
SMEs, universities and PROs; and 
 contributing to the development of new financial instruments (venture capital) for 
business start-ups. 
Regarding regional initiatives, case studies of good practice from the regional 
programmes of innovative actions 2000–2006 show a large presence of programmes co-
financed by regional policy in the EU-15 with the aim of trying out new approaches, new 
partnerships and new ideas for development. They are mainly cluster or partnership-
based, driven by pilot projects and technology transfer oriented. 
A role for technology and knowledge transfer (KT) in regional policies is recognised 
without specific mention of a regional contribution to intellectual property and IPR policy. 
Another European Commission Communication contains a section relating to IP and 
affirms that ’there is still scope to make the EU IP system more responsive to the 
evolution of research processes and actions are needed to promote the optimal use of 
IPR systems in the EU, with a specific emphasis on academic institutions and smaller 
business’ (European Commission, 2003). 
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In this respect, the Committee of the Regions (2004) endorses the Commission proposal 
for the EU to develop guidelines for the administration and exploitation of IPR and 
licences resulting from publicly-funded research, and supports the proposal for EU-wide 
IPR awareness and training activities for researchers and students, as long as these 
additional activities can be provided on a voluntary basis. 
Since 2005, the European regional policy has also been more strongly associated with 
the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy. The Lisbon National Reform Plans were linked to 
the Cohesion Policy programmes for 2007–2013. With this new Cohesion Policy, 
resources shifted to implement the Lisbon Strategy. In this light, patents are one of the 
major tools which can foster innovation. Therefore, publicly-sponsored projects or public 
measures projects could give an incentive towards the transfer of IP from academia to 
industry and subsequently lead to the development of market-ready products. 
The European Commission identifies the need to improve technology and KT between 
PROs and third parties as a key element of the European innovation strategy (European 
Commission, 2007c). To move in this direction a single European ownership model for 
PROs’ IPR is seen as necessary: the idea is to have a coherent European landscape as 
well as a more level playing field.  
The Council of the European Union invited the Commission to develop guidance on the 
management of IPR by PROs, and in 2008 the Commission issued a recommendation in 
which it provides Member States with policy guidelines for developing and updating 
national guidelines and frameworks (European Commission, 2008c). Moreover, the 
European Commission identifies those practices of public authorities that facilitate the 
management of IP in KT by Universities and PROs. Finally, the European Commission 
provides PROs with a code of practice in order to improve the way they manage IPR and 
KT. The code of practice gives, among other things, some guidelines for IP co-ownership 
arising from collaborative and contract research, which in European Member States, 
except in Denmark, is still based on a default regime, which applies in absence of any 
regulation, with the effect of high uncertainty and resistance to cooperation, especially 
between public and private parties. The practices of public authorities that facilitate the 
management of IP in KT concern mainly national authorities. They incentivise universities 
to create technology transfer organisations and monitor the impact of these actions or 
the PROs’ IP policy. Already within the recommendations of an expert group report (ITTE, 
July 2004), the possibility of a ‘general reporting system’ on PRO transfer activities, 
adjusted to national needs, but including a number of common indicators, such as 
performance indicators (number of client enterprises, number of spin-offs, etc.) has been 
suggested. 
Important changes were introduced during the 2000s in Europe, inspired by the Bayh-
Dole legislation entered in force in United States in 1980, which gives to University the 
possibility of being entitled to IPRs on their patentable research results. The rationale of 
this important Act was to face the technological gap identified in the industrial 
productivity decline that started in the 1970s, through the introduction of specific 
incentives to the technology transfer from HEIs. The Act was designed also for reducing 
the conflicts among public funding agencies and between these and HEIs about the 
ownership of proprietary rights, by a simplification of the rules of IPR attribution. The law 
scope was also that of supporting the awareness of HEIs on the commercial utility and 
value of some research results and to give HEIs better control over applications of public 
research, including quality and ethical aspects. 
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The effects of the Act are still under scrutiny, since some authors maintain that its role 
has been over-valued, while other scholars point to evidence that the economic returns 
given by licensing activity to HEIs, when taking into account the costs of managing IPR 
and licenses, is very low and skewed by a few ‘blockbusters’. In any case from 1980s in 
the United States the number of academic patents has grown up impressively and the 
licensing activity has accompanied it.  
 
5.2 What we already know 
The idea of a ‘European Paradox’ (a lack of research results use, in presence of a good 
scientific productivity) is still strongly diffused and supported by European analysis: the 
Innovation Scoreboard shows that Europe, even with a higher number of graduates in 
S&T fields in comparison with United States, is still behind in terms of innovation and 
patents. In particular, the number of academic patents in Europe is lower than that in the 
United States. Therefore, it is necessary to develop policies and strategies to transfer and 
commercially exploit academic results.  
This evidence is counterbalanced by the results of relatively recent empirical studies, 
pointing out the widely-distributed presence in European countries of academic-based 
inventions owned by firms (PatVal-EU survey 2007). The current debate is about how to 
interpret these results: what kind/quality of research is behind these academic-invented 
patents? The open model of KT traditionally followed by universities, has been 
accompanied by consulting and contract based relations between industry and HEIs 
(especially in some disciplines), which, when producing patentable results, awards 
ownership to the firms. Moreover in some European countries there was also in the past 
(as in Italy since the 1930s) the possibility of academics patenting the results of public-
funded research, but it has hardly ever been used. This publicly-sponsored research is 
often a more early-stage research, with a larger application range. 
In sum, until the 2000s in European countries the results of academic-based research, 
which needed to be accompanied by a proactive public strategy of knowledge transfer 
and exploitation, and required additional work and costs without reward in terms of 
career or scientific recognition, have been poorly translated into codified and 
appropriable outputs. Transfer of knowledge, which is a core aspect of the relation 
between University and Industry, is largely managed at regional or local level. 
In the 2000s, academic IPR reforms have been implemented in many European countries 
in order to promote a pro-active IPR strategy within HEIs, in some countries allowing IPR 
ownership by these public institutions. The reforms have been characterised by many 
differences among countries: some countries have abandoned the previous professor 
privilege in favour of an institutional IPR ownership, while others have kept or adopted it. 
What is important is that these reforms are part of a wider institutional change within 
public research systems, characterised by larger autonomy and more social 
responsibility. The administrative reforms allow universities to become organisations with 
a collective scope and control over their own results. Some studies (Della Malva et al., 
2008; Baldini et al., 2007), looking at the change in public-owned academic patents as a 
function of time events, show that a more proactive IPR behaviour is visible in many 
countries after the introduction of this kind of New Public Management (NPM) reforms. 
These changes have been followed by the creation of specific transfer offices and internal 
to universities’ IPR regulations, supporting the IPR strategy management. 
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5.3 What is new 
Even if the number of academic-owned patents increased, the key problem is the low use 
of these patents. The performance of the transfer activity in terms of number of licenses 
of spin-offs taken up by industrial clients (including SMEs), even ignoring economic 
returns, is now recognised as neither a reliable goal nor the primary reason for 
knowledge transfer by HEIs. There is here a discrepancy between public research 
institutions and industry; while industry (in the form of SMEs) is often regionally 
dependent, HEIs and PRO are mainly striving for international academic recognition and a 
wide scale of fields; their interests do not match with those of local industry.  
A survey (Crespi et al., 2006) on EPO patents identified two relevant kinds of problem: 
 there is a high percentage of academic-owned patents that are not used: more 
than 40%, while licences account for only 5% of all academic-owned patents;  
 there is a lack of IPR coming from collaborative research with public-private co-
inventors and of co-ownership between public and private organisations. 
Here there is room for regional policy, focused on: 
 supporting the demand side of KT, but also building on specific infrastructure 
(incubators, science parks);  
 promoting HEIs and PROs networking and collaboration with industry; 
 supporting spin-offs with specific measures; 
 diffusing IP awareness through training initiatives. 
The construction of regional databases on public research results and IP can also be a 
fundamental tool for circulating knowledge to potential industrial users. This is a way to 
reduce barriers to accessing knowledge and pave the way to market for technology.  
Perhaps secondary effects may also be beneficial: e.g. the familiarisations with a 
technology, which may not be a direct KT, but raise awareness in local companies. 
 
5.4 Policy implications 
An expert group (Mac Donald, Capart et al, 2004) was organised by the Directorate 
General for Research (DG RTD) of the European Commission in the context of a series of 
activities supporting ERA. This expert group reviewed the evolution of the knowledge 
transfer models, from the open model (where PROs do not retain any IPR) to a licensing 
model (in which the PROs started to retain, protect and commercialise inventions based 
on their discoveries, by licensing IPR to industry or start-up companies, without any 
other involvement in the development of potential application. This licensing model has 
been successful in the United States, but it has not been as successful in Europe, 
because of a more fragmented market and a lower density of research-based companies 
headquartered in Europe. 
Over the last ten years a third knowledge transfer model, which we call the Innovative 
model, has started to develop in Europe. In this model the Licensing Model, which is still 
important, has been supplemented by a more active policy of collaborative research with 
industry, in particular through EC Framework programmes and by a proactive 
involvement in the creation of spin-out companies. The results are ‘comparatively more 
important at regional level’ (Mac Donald, Capart et al., 2004).  
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In the collaborative model, substantial IP is generated by the PROs within collaborative or 
sponsored research and may be retained as a basis for further research and collaboration 
with the same or other partners. The further development of collaborative research on a 
fair and equitable basis is one of the essential components of the collaborative model. It 
is one of the ways by which proof of principle and demonstration of economic utility for 
PRO inventions and know-how can be funded with both industry and public financial 
support. 
The common feature of Licensing and Collaborative models is the identification, 
registration and management of an intellectual property pool from which the various 
innovation models can be drawn. But in the Collaborative Model of KT the demand side is 
more stressed. 
In this chapter, we developed an answer to the question of IP and regions particularly 
related to University-industry relations. Below we present some open questions and we 
provide some suggestions on possible ways of handling them.  
Some problematic aspects may be nevertheless underlined: 
 Under what conditions can the  regions as innovation systems can well function   
in terms of technology transfer policy?  
 To what extent is technology transfer taking place at global, national or regional 
level?  
 Under what conditions can technology transfer be considered as a mechanism of 
integration at regional level? Differently phrased: can the question of university-
industry relation be treated within a frame of local integration, without reducing 
the role of University? and do universities are interested in it?  
Regions are positioned very differently with reference to newly emerging technologies, 
existing industrial capacities, knowledge and human resources basis. The selective 
environment at regional level could provide mechanisms for integration and innovation, 
but enhancement can have the cost of blocking innovation in other frameworks (supra-
regional).  
Possible solutions can come from: 
 the presence of differentiated types of HEIs, which can dialogue with global, 
national or regional knowledge users; 
 the support to linkages between backward regions and supra-national and 
European innovation networks; 
 creation of networks for better integrated innovation development 
 the promotion of public venture subsidies for promoting the entry of new, more 
technology-oriented firms at local level; 
 regional support to national schemes; 
 giving voices both to business and scientific institutions when deciding the 
regional priorities.  
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6 PATENTS AND STANDARDISATION 
6.1 Problématique 
A large number of high technology industries are based on technological and procedural 
standards. Standardisation is the process of developing and agreeing upon technical 
standards.3 The presence of standards significantly affects the dynamics of investments 
in research and innovation in such industries due to the bundle of strategic interactions 
among innovators before the establishment of a new technology-based standard. The 
assignment and management of IPR clearly plays a crucial role in such strategic 
interactions. In principle, technological standards are welfare improving to the extent 
that they allow economies of scale in production, foster a more rapid diffusion of 
innovation, assure interoperability and reduce technological uncertainty and redundancy 
of R&D investments, particularly in markets characterised by the presence of network 
economies.  
In such a context, Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2007) recognise a two-fold relationship 
between patents and standards. Firstly, the strategic exploitation of patents can prevent 
the establishment of standards that would otherwise be socially desirable. Secondly, 
standards can excessively weaken or reinforce the market power provided by patents. 
The first situation takes place when a firm holds a patent that is essential to a specific 
standard and refuses to provide it at reasonable conditions to current competitors and 
new entrants, opting to introduce its own (technologically inferior) standard. Notably, 
such a situation can be seriously worsened when there are multiple companies holding 
essential patents. The strategic relevance of the issue is witnessed by a recent paper by 
Goodman and Myers (2005) who show that, on the basis of experts’ evaluations, up to 
80% of the patents that firms claimed to be essential for a mobile telephone standard 
were not in fact essential (see also the discussion provided in Dewatriponts and Legro, 
2008). 
The second situation takes place when the owners of the IPR backing the standard refuse 
access to others at reasonable conditions. In this case, the scope of the original patent 
protection turns out to be over-extended, preventing the development of second 
generation or complementary products (Mueller, 2002). An additional welfare-detrimental 
strategic behaviour of patent holders, whereby they exploit the presence of technological 
standards to increase the value of their patent portfolio at the expense of collective 
welfare, relates to the so-called hold up problem. During the standardisation process a 
company might decide not to disclose its patents in order to favour the convergence of 
other players towards a specific standard. The same company, after the adoption and 
diffusion of the standards can then make claims on the basis of owning essential patents 
that require the payment of royalties from those producers that have already incurred 
relevant sunk costs (Henkel and Reitzig, 2008). 
                                                 
3 A standard is a document that establishes uniform engineering or technical specifications, criteria, methods, 
processes, or practices. The goals of standardisation can be to help with independence of single suppliers 
(commoditisation), compatibility, interoperability, safety, repeatability, or quality. 
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While the latter conduct has been considered a form of competition abuse, there are still 
open issues, both in terms of academic research and policy actions, about the impact of 
different forms of inter-firm agreements for the management of IPR within 
standardisation processes. A number of recent legal disputes confirm the relevance of the 
issue (see the US FTC decision in 2006 on the Rambus case). 
 
6.2 What we already know 
In order to identify the potential role of governments in the issues at stake it is important 
to recall that standards can be established by simple market selection processes, by 
spontaneous industry bodies or standard-setting organisations (SSOs), or by 
governmental bodies. In each of these situations, different rules are set to manage the 
IPR related to the standardised technology. In this respect, Lemley (2002) conducted a 
detailed assessment of the rules for the management of IPR in numerous standard-
setting organisations, revealing how in most cases they impose limitations on members 
by forcing them to cross-licence their patents under reasonable and non-discriminatory 
conditions. However, only in rare cases are such mandatory prescriptions extended to 
non-member firms. 
The influence of the openness and ‘closedness’ (i.e. protection by IPR) of standards on 
dynamic competition has already been analysed in early works by Farrell and Saloner 
(1985) and Farrell and Katz (1998). The main finding is that openness leads to price and 
quality competition within a common standard, whereas proprietary standards lead to 
competition between different specifications and therefore make fragmentation of the 
market more likely. 
In addition, Blind and Thumm (2004) analyse the relationship between strategies to 
protect patents and their impact on the likelihood of joining formal standardisation 
processes. Their results support the theoretical hypothesis that companies at the leading 
edge are often in such a strong position that they do not need the support of standards 
to market their products successfully. At the case study level, different studies report 
evidence of conflicts within a formal standardisation process due to interests of patent-
holders, especially in the telecommunication sector (for the standard of Global System 
for Mobile communications or GSM see Bekkers et al., 2002). 
Because most technological standards are defined by industry bodies, Lemley (2002) has 
surveyed the rules and bylaws of 29 different standard-setting organisations, mainly in 
the area of telecommunications and computer-networking industries, where many of the 
most contentious intellectual property issues arise. This analysis shows that standard 
SSOs significantly contribute to ameliorate the problems of overlapping IPR and that 
there is a dual role for government: to support the emergence of private-ordering 
agreements by limiting excessive ex-ante antitrust pressure and to scrutinise the 
standard-setting process to ensure that IPR functions as intended. 
Furthermore, Chiao et al. (2006) have compiled a database of nearly 60 industry-based 
SSOs. They identified how the presence of a provision mandating royalty-free licensing is 
negatively associated with the presence of a disclosure requirement, while weaker 
reasonable-and-non-discriminatory (RAND) licensing requirements are strongly 
associated with such a provision. Finally, Leiponen (2008) suggests that in many cases 
standard setting occurs within a network of loosely affiliated organisations and that a 
firm’s position in that network can influence its effectiveness within a focal SSO. 
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6.3 What is new 
Patent pools may represent a solution for reducing the transaction costs caused by the 
integration of patent-protected technologies into standards. A patent pool is an 
agreement among patent owners to licence a set of their patents to one another or to 
third parties. They are deemed to be particular useful when a large number of patents 
has to be considered for integration into a standard (e.g. GSM). When subsequent 
innovators must negotiate with such large numbers of patent holders, they may face 
excessive transaction costs (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998). However, in order to establish 
and run patent pools efficiently and to promote their general welfare advantages, some 
potential conflicts and disadvantages (e.g. the misuse of price-fixing mechanisms) have 
to be taken into account. 
There is now widespread agreement among policymakers and scholars that patent pools 
may benefit both intellectual property owners and consumers, provided that the pools 
include patents that are complementary or blocking (Merges, 1999; Shapiro, 2001). 
Lerner and Tirole (2004) analyses the strategic incentives to form a pool in the presence 
of innovations which either compete with or are complementary to patents in the pool. 
They find that a pool is welfare improving as long as the patents included are actually 
complementary. In principle, patent pools might also reduce the problem of padding (the 
inclusion in the pool of allegedly ‘essential’ patents that actual are not) since the pool’s 
members have incentives to monitor behaviour so as not to share their revenues with 
participants whose IP is not making a contribution (Dewatriponts and Legros, 2008). 
However, despite the attractiveness of this type of inter-firm agreement, it has to be 
observed that the standardisation of a technology which is based on a pool of patents 
does not automatically mean that the technologically, or even economically, superior 
solution will succeed. Even if wide-ranging patent pools covering all major key players 
may solve conflicts between patent holders, they have to be carefully monitored because 
they may overrule better solutions from individuals or smaller consortia with weaker 
patents or economic power (Blind and Thumm, 2004). 
 
6.4 Policy implications 
The contributions examined highlighted the absolute importance of improving an 
institutional and legal framework to support the effective diffusion of European 
standards, taking into consideration IPR-related issues within a context of voluntary and 
market-based standard setting processes. In this regard, the European Commission 
supports the view that standards should be open for access and implementation by 
everyone, with IPR relevant to the standard being taken into account in the 
standardisation process, aiming to establish a balance between the interests of the users 
of standards and the rights of owners of IP (EC, 2008b). Furthermore, the European 
Commission clearly stated that standardisation processes will represent a key element for 
the development of the so called lead market policy initiative, which aims to accelerate 
the emergence of innovative market areas through the close coordination of innovation 
policy instruments. The recent document on standardisation and innovation by the 
European Council (Council of the European Union, 2008) explicitly asks European 
standardisation bodies to be particularly vigilant when developing standards based on 
proprietary technologies, in order to allow broad access to all users, and emphasises the 
need to implement procedures designed to make intellectual property rights available 
under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory conditions. 
More specifically, the most relevant policy issues in this field pertain to the following 
aspects. 
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First, in defining policy recommendations, more emphasis should be devoted to the 
characteristics of the technology undergoing the standardisation process. In fact, 
following Lemley (2002), while standardisation can be beneficial in a wide variety of 
markets, it is worth distinguishing between two different types of standards: standards 
that define the technical features for interoperability in a network (e.g. in 
telecommunication devices, ICT equipment, etc.) and those that govern the quality or 
safety of a product. 
In the first case, the fact that industry members rapidly agree on a standard leads to a 
positive impact in a market characterised by network externalities, even if the chosen 
standard is not the superior one from a technical point of view. Hence, in some cases it 
may be more important that an industry rapidly converges around a single standard to 
allow the diffusion of a technology or service eventually benefiting consumers. In the 
second case, where network externalities are not present the emergence of a suboptimal 
standard by a technical point of view turns to be more welfare detrimental.   
Secondly, concerning the rules for the management of IPR through SSOs, it has emerged 
that the typical policy mandating that a royalty be fair, reasonable and non 
discriminatory (FRAND) gives little guidance for royalty determination, leaving room for 
potential ex post opportunistic behaviours. At the same time it is clear that while 
mandatory royalty-free licensing may provide a theoretical solution, such a change would 
obviously negatively affect innovation incentives and give raise to legal problems. 
Moreover, in the case of mandatory royalty-free licenses, formal standardisation bodies 
are expected to lose their attractiveness for innovative companies endowed with relevant 
patent portfolios, which will turn to the more flexible standardisation consortia (Blind et 
al., 2004; Chiao et al., 2007). 
The difficulty for some smaller firms in joining the standardisation group and obtaining 
voting rights in the definition of the standard can lead to excessive market power for 
large incumbent companies. This calls for a constant monitoring of the activities of SSOs, 
with particular reference to their transparency in the rules for affiliation of members, the 
disclosure of relevant patents and the determination of royalties. Standard setting 
protocols have to promote the emergence of standardisation practises in which IPR do 
not negatively affect a proper balance between consumer welfare and innovation 
incentives for second generation and complementary products. The recent initiatives by 
the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) for improvements in the 
transparency of their procedures represent an example of this type of approach. These 
provisions include the disclosure on the web of the list of the patent rights deemed to be 
relevant for each standard, the obligation for members to provide licenses under FRAND 
conditions, the availability of ex ante disclosure of licensing terms (ETSI, 2008). The 
latter is a voluntary mechanism to commit to licensing terms before the protected 
technology is selected and locked in as part of a standard. In particular, the ex ante 
disclosure of licensing terms can have a number of positive effects: it favours 
competition on the basis of technology and price before the standard is approved, it 
prevents the possibility of ex post monopoly pricing once lock-in has occurred and it 
allows prospective market entrants to calculate their expected entry costs after the 
standard is adopted. Such advantages clearly come at the cost of increasing the risk of 
anticompetitive behaviours (Swanson and Baumol, 2005), e.g. group discussions of 
disclosed licensing terms may lead to group boycott conduct (Meinhold, 2008).  
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Given the global dimension of technological markets, it is also key to support 
international institutions devoted to promote collaborations among regional SSOs. A 
relevant example of such an initiative is World Standards Cooperation (WSC): in 2007 
the world’s leading international standards organizations – the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
and International Telecommunication Union (ITU) – adopted a harmonised approach to 
addressing the inclusion of patented technology in standards (see 
http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/ipr).  
Thirdly, the increasing diffusion of patent pools requires particular attention and a shared 
view on the methodologies applicable to identify the actual level of complementarity 
among patents included in the pool, so as to ensure that the pool is welfare enhancing. 
Although the concept of technological complementarity is likely to be highly sector 
specific, a significant effort should be put in the development of empirical tests and in 
their translation into clear guidelines.    
Fourthly, the difficulty in identifying illegitimate forms of exploitation of patent rights calls 
for the need to support actions aiming at favouring collaborations among SSOs and 
patent offices. The potential contributions of patent offices may include providing services 
such as automatic updating of SSOs’ IPR databases, carrying out patent searches on 
demand and advice on improving transparency through making the relevant information 
about uncertainty in specific areas of pending patents publicly available (see Karachalios, 
2008). 
Finally, as previously mentioned, a major concern in standard setting processes in recent 
years relates to the so called ‘patent ambush’, a strategic conduct consisting of not 
declaring the ownership of patents relevant to a standard in order to block it afterwards 
or to extract high royalties once the standard has already reached a high level of 
adoption. As witnessed by recent legal cases, this type of innovation detrimental 
strategic conduct has been punished in Europe as an abuse of dominant position. A 
recent study on standardisation in Information and Communication Technologies 
sponsored by the European Commission highlights the tradeoffs and the specific 
criticalities of interventions forcing firms to mandatory licensing in these cases (European 
Commission, 2007b). However, apart from specific cases, the issue in general still needs 
further assessment and the development of shared policy directions. 
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7 THE USE OF EXISTING PATENTS 
7.1 Problématique 
Patents can be used by the holder, other firms, public authorities and researchers for 
myriad purposes. Regarding the holder, patents can be used:  
 to restrain the power of suppliers by owning key technology elements;  
 to freeze a technology by preventing the development of a particular market or 
technology;  
 to set up picket fences through reactive patent behaviour;  
 to prevent others from acquiring IPR;  
 to create a smoke screen by filing patent applications on technologies which will 
not be exploited, etc. (Guellec et al., 2007). 
In particular, businesses have a variety of reasons for seeking patent protection, which 
can include:  
 provisional protection of an innovation by holding pending applications;  
 building monopoly position;  
 blocking others from entering a market;  
 assembling a portfolio of rights to create financial strength;  
 getting a seat at the table when standards are being set;  
 creating marketing messages and becoming more visible in a market;  
 generating licence income;  
 building a base for infringement claims;  
 preventing lawsuits;  
 measuring the performance of the company;  
 communicating innovativeness to investors;  
 avoiding the consequences of not patenting.  
These reasons can be grouped into the following main motivations for patenting:  
 commercial exploitation 
 licensing 
 cross-licensing 
 prevention from imitation 
 blocking competitors 
 reputation.  
While the uses of patents can be grouped as follows:  
 internal 
 licensing 
 cross-licensing 
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 licensing and using 
 blocking competitors 
 not using (European Patent Office, 2007). 
What use do firms make of their patents? Why are some patents exploited commercially, 
while others are licensed out to other firms, and still others are left unused? These are 
relevant issues, as the ability to translate new technologies into economically valuable 
goods or services is crucial for the competitiveness of firms, regions, and countries. 
Usually, information on the use and non-use of the patents is not available, especially for 
Europe and for cross-country and cross-sectoral studies.  
The European Commission (2004) shows that at the overall EU-6 level: 
 50% of patents are used internally; 
 35% are not used – specifically, 18.7% are filed for strategic reasons and 17.4% 
are ‘sleeping’ patents; 
 15% of the patents are exchanged in the market for technologies, 6.4% are 
licensed, 4.0% are both licensed and used internally and 3.0% are used in cross-
licensing agreements. 
It is worth mentioning that these figures vary across countries, technologies, applicants 
and size. For instance, the share of unused patents is 18% in SMEs compared to 40% in 
large firms and universities. 
With respect to firms other than the holder, patents can be used for inventing around or 
obtaining licences. Apart from that, patents can be used by ‘trolls’ for litigating patent 
infringements. As far as researchers are concerned, patents can be used for mapping the 
state of the art, technological forecasting etc. In particular, searching for a patent has 
become a frustrating and convoluted process because there is no streamlined and 
universal approach for searching patent documents at the various patent offices. 
Regarding the effectiveness of IP protection mechanisms in the formation of research 
partnerships, patents are most frequently used to protect both background and 
foreground knowledge in partnerships. Existing IP titles are quite useful when negotiating 
new partnerships (Hertzfeld et al., 2006). Hall and Ziedonis (2001) underlined the use of 
patents as bargaining chips and as a means of avoiding hold-up problems. 
 
7.2 What we already know 
Patent accumulation concentrated in a few large firms may result in an increase in 
innovation over time because large firms may be better able to take advantage of 
economies of scale. Since R&D typically involves large fixed costs, which may include the 
creation of new patents and the use of existing patents, larger firms may be better 
equipped to appropriate knowledge through patent ownership. Larger firms may have 
better access to financing and may be better able to diversify their projects, more 
effectively decreasing their exposure to risk. Further, significant complementarities often 
exist among products sold by the same firm. Thus larger firms may have better 
knowledge of the demand and size of potential markets (Symeonidis, 1996).  
On the other hand, if patent ownership is concentrated in the hands of very few firms, 
rival firms must subsequently licence technology from patent owners or invent around 
the original patented invention. Therefore sequential innovation costs for firms in general 
may rise if future inventions rely upon the previous work of others. 
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In answer to the questions of how SMEs make use of patents now, how SMEs expect to 
use them in future, and what problems SMEs encounter using the existing patent system, 
Eurochambers (2006) has said that the main problems relate to high costs, tedious, 
laborious and time-consuming procedures, language problems, ineffective and costly real 
protection of patent rights and non-uniformity of systems.  As a result, SMEs do not 
make extensive use of patents. The situation is, however, expected to improve if an 
effective and cost efficient patent system is put in place in Europe. 
Increasing competition provides the incentive for firms to become more mobile, moving 
to regions where labour costs are low, the regulatory burden less onerous and conditions 
negotiable. Consequently, companies are increasingly turning to international expansion 
and foreign direct investment (European Patent Office, 2007). 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is sensitive to international differences in IPR in sectors 
with knowledge-based assets. FDI representing complex but easily copied technologies is 
likely to increase with the strengthening of IPR, because patents increase the value of 
knowledge-based assets, which may be efficiently exploited through internalised 
organisation. To the extent that licensing costs come down with stronger IPR, FDI could 
be displaced over time by efficient licensing. Whatever the mode, the likelihood that the 
most advanced technologies will be transferred rises with strengthened IPR. Investment 
and technology transfer are relatively insensitive to international differences in IPR in 
sectors with old products and standardised, labour-intensive technologies. Here, FDI is 
influenced by factor costs, market sizes, trade costs and other location advantages 
(Maskus, 2000). 
Royalties and licence fees are affected by the strength of patent regimes. IPR can 
underpin an efficient system of contracts to promote formal technology transfer through 
licensing. The potential increases in licensing volumes from strengthening such rights 
could be significant, and the quality of the technologies should rise. In this respect, 
technology importers will pay higher costs to absorb more and better technologies as a 
result of tighter IPR. Stronger IPR could also permit firms to choose not to license their 
closely held technologies except in cross-licensing or patent-pooling arrangements. Thus, 
a trade-off is likely to emerge between stronger licensing incentives and greater 
prerogatives to maintain technologies under close control (Yang and Maskus, 2001). 
As to the records of licence agreements in Europe, it would be useful to provide all the 
relevant information on a unique database similar to the American one, which would help 
third parties in the preparation of strategies vis-à-vis licence requests. It would also 
ensure improved fluidity in the market for technology. In the United States, the federal 
securities laws require publicly-traded companies to disclose information on an ongoing 
basis. Examples of material contracts include licence agreements. The SEC’s EDGAR 
database provides free public access to corporate information, allowing third parties to 
quickly research a company’s financial information and operations by reviewing 
registration statements, prospectuses and periodic reports. Third parties can also find 
information about recent corporate events that a company does not have to disclose to 
investors (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008). 
 
7.3 What is new 
According to Chan (2008), it is unclear how firms are using their patent portfolios and 
whether an increase in portfolio size leads to an increase in firm innovation. For example, 
Lemley and Shapiro (2005) describe several uses of patents that do not directly lead to 
the development of a new product. Examples include obtaining financing, boosting 
market valuation, creating patent thickets, deterring others from suing, etc.  
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As far as patent search is concerned, the three main repositories of English-language 
patent documents — the EPO, the USPTO and WIPO — offer free databases with online 
search tools that all work differently, display different results, which require the user to 
enter numbers, dates and keywords in different formats, and which are displayed 
idiosyncratically (Nature Biotechnology 2006). Because searching and accessing patents 
in the free official online database is rather difficult, patent search firms provide user-
friendly databases, such as Thomson-Reuters and Questel. 
Different types of searches used by attorneys or agents help assess novelty, validity, 
infringement, clearance and state of the art. First, novelty searches are conducted prior 
to the filing of a patent application. The patentability search seeks to determine if anyone 
disclosed the invention concept in a publicly available work anywhere in the world before.  
Second, validity searches (invalidity searches) are used to determine absolute novelty at 
the time of the invention. For this reason, a validity search may be thought of as an 
exhaustive patentability search that has been conducted after publication of the patent 
application or issuance of the patent. With this search, the claims are validated against 
all prior art.  
Third, infringement searches are used to determine whether an enforceable patent 
already claims the same matter as the concept, unpatented invention, expired patents or 
mere publications. Accordingly, the document set for these searches consists only of 
unexpired (in-force) patents.  
Fourth, clearance searches (right-to-use or freedom-to-operate searches) are used to 
determine whether a party has clearance to make, use and sell an inventive concept. 
Clearance is established when a patent has not been infringed or has otherwise expired.  
Finally, ‘state-of-the-art’ searches are comprehensive searches of all available patent and 
non-patent literature to determine the direction of research activities (Hunt et al., 2007). 
Patent databases contain a wealth of technical information, but only a fraction of 
innovative SMEs use them as an information source. In this respect, the probability of 
using patent databases increases with firm size and is higher among firms that perform 
R&D or use patents as an appropriation method. Furthermore, the use of patents as an 
important information source is correlated with the patent propensity rate in each 
industrial sector. Finally, SMEs mainly use patent databases to acquire information, often 
for legal purposes, which is not available from any other source. In contrast, these 
databases are seldom used to acquire technical data, largely because of the cost in terms 
of personnel time and expertise. This points to the need for simpler and more efficient 
methods of searching patent databases (Arundel and Steinmueller, 1998). 
Once a European patent has been granted, it becomes a bundle of national patents 
governed by national laws. The International Patent Documentation Centre (INPADOC) is 
an international patent collection produced, maintained and updated by the EPO. The 
INPADOC database, which is publicly accessible, provides information about patent 
families, i.e. corresponding patent applications, in different countries which claim the 
same priority and which normally disclose the same invention. It also provides 
information concerning the legal status of patent applications and patents in those 
countries which report status changes. Consequently, third parties can access INPADOC 
in order to know the status of the different national patents. 
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7.4 Policy implications 
Full-text English language records of patent documents are available at the EPO, USPTO 
and WIPO, which have English-language titles and claims, and sometimes are written in 
full-text English. The primary challenge presented by full-text searching is constructing 
useful search queries using foreign language keywords. The next obstacle in full-text 
searching is interpreting non-English language results or hits. As to peculiar issues to 
certain technological fields, the patent offices have experienced a rapid expansion in the 
number of biotechnology-related applications. Often, developing comprehensive lists of 
synonyms can take significant research. Biotechnology synonyms are usually not 
intuitively apparent (Hunt et al., 2007). 
For answering the question as to what extent and for what purpose do innovative firms 
use patents, surveys show that patents should be considered as one component in the 
appropriation strategy of firms, and often not the most important one (Guellec, 2007). To 
the question of whether or not patents add value to innovation, Arora et al. (2003) find 
that for most innovations the patent premium should be negative, which is the reason 
why so many innovations are not patented and for those which are actually patented the 
patent premium is significant and has a skewed distribution. To the question whether or 
not patents induce further R&D and innovation, Arora et al. (2003) find that patents have 
a positive impact on R&D expenditure in certain industries. 
In particular, patents are used for securing return from inventions in certain industries. 
The share of product innovations which are patented is very high for pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals, machinery, office and computer equipment, and precision instruments but 
very low for transport and telecommunication services, transport equipment, basic 
metals, and textile and clothing. Further, patents are more effective for product 
innovations than for process innovations because processes are not as easily accessible 
to competitors as products (Arundel and Kabla, 1998). In addition, patents are more 
often used for protecting radical innovations, based on R&D, than for protecting more 
marginal inventions based on other means (Licht and Zolz, 1998). 
Finally, the use of patents by research centres and universities is very limited, resulting 
in a lack of incentives and financing for research, as well as a poor record for licensing 
and transferring technology and knowledge to industry. The latest European innovation 
scoreboard listed only five European countries as innovation leaders. This shows that 
patenting issues remain insufficiently addressed (Pompidou, 2007). 
There is much more potential for building on the existing EPC system by voluntary 
measures such as EPLA and the London Protocol and adding some measures that really 
help universities, such as the grace period and flexible provisional systems. The 
excessive costs of patenting in Europe come to a large extent from the maintenance of 
national patent systems with no significant benefits. These resources could be used more 
effectively to support the innovation process. In other words, it is encouraged that more 
Member States progressively abandon their national systems and rely on the European 
patent only. The other advantage of this approach is that it does not require unanimity of 
the member states and should be easier to implement. If the member states are really 
serious about opening the way to a community patent system, they should not object to 
this. It requires political courage and the capability of admitting that a good idea 20 
years ago may no longer be a good idea today (Capart, 2006). 
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8 PATENTS AND COMPETITION 
8.1 Problématique 
Innovators are motivated by high expected profits, which are increased by a monopolistic 
position. On the other hand, companies with a solid monopolistic position tend not to be 
motivated to innovate as that would not significantly increase their already substantial 
profit margin. The threat or reality of competition forces incumbents to innovate, while 
for newcomers innovation is their ticket to enter the market (Encaoua and Ulph, 2000). 
A patent is the right to exclude competitors. A patent has direct anti-competitive effects 
as a product will have a higher price if it embodies a patented technology due to market 
power conferred by the patent. Nonetheless, competition will be induced by follow-up 
inventions in a dynamic process. In fast-moving technological areas, the monopoly 
position possibly provided by successful innovation is only temporary as new inventions 
arrive quickly, with superior technology taking over the market and leapfrogging 
incumbents. In this cycle, patents play the role of strengthening the market power that 
accrues to the successful inventor, hence reinforcing the incentive to innovate ex ante, 
but possibly weakening the incentive to innovate for the winner, at least ex post (Guellec 
et al., 2007). 
According to Duxbury and Tuck (2009), a more recent factor affecting pharmaceutical 
companies’ patenting and protection strategies is the European Commission’s stance on 
antitrust law in an IP context. The AstraZeneca decision (Commission Decision of 2005: 
Case COMP/37.507: Generics/AstraZeneca) together with the Commission’s continuing 
sector inquiry have left the industry facing a great deal of uncertainty over what it will be 
permissible for a company to carry out in its IP and commercial strategy, particularly 
when in a dominant position. The Commission’s definition of the market in the 
AstraZeneca case seems to unfairly penalise the innovative company by creating a 
structure where the innovator that is the first to market with a new class of drugs will 
inevitably hold a dominant position (Wragge and Co., 2008). 
The preliminary results of the sector inquiry (European Commission, 2008a) show that 
market entry of generic companies and the development of new and more affordable 
medicines is sometimes blocked or delayed, at significant cost to healthcare systems, 
consumers and taxpayers. Citing a sample of medicines that faced patent expiration in 
the period 2000 to 2007 in 17 Member States, the European Commission report 
suggested that additional savings of around €3 billion would have been possible on that 
sample over this period if generic medicines had entered the market without delay. For 
the same samples over the said period total savings gained by generic entry amounted to 
at least €14 billion, the report added. Defining originator companies as the ones that 
develop and sell new medicines, the report found that these companies used a variety of 
methods to delay or block the market entry of not only generic companies but also other 
originator competitors. On the practices that the originator drug companies use to delay 
or block market entry of competing medicines, the European Commission listed among 
others: multiple patent applications for the same medicine (so called patent clusters,) 
initiation of disputes and litigation, conclusion of patent settlements which constrain 
market entry of generic companies and interventions before national authorities when 
generic companies ask for regulatory approvals (Singh, 2008). 
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8.2 What we already know 
As far as the legal architecture is concerned, the antitrust area covers two prohibition 
rules set out in the EC Treaty. First, agreements between two or more firms which 
restrict competition are prohibited by Article 81 of the EC Treaty, subject to some limited 
exceptions. Second, firms in a dominant position may not abuse that position (Article 82 
of the EC Treaty). The European Commission is empowered by the EC Treaty to apply 
these prohibition rules and enjoys a number of investigative powers to that end (e.g. 
inspection in business and non-business premises, written requests for information etc). 
It may also impose fines on undertakings which violate EU antitrust rules. All national 
competition authorities are also empowered to apply fully the provisions of the Treaty in 
order to ensure that competition is not distorted or restricted. National courts may also 
apply these prohibitions so as to protect the individual rights conferred to citizens by the 
EC Treaty. 
From the perspective of economics, there is a direct relationship between the sales of 
innovative products and market structure and, implicitly, the average size of firms in a 
specific branch. According to the product life cycle, there are many small firms that 
compete in the first stages of technological development on design, and on combinations 
of product and market. In this situation, the market structure manifests a low seller 
concentration. Later in the cycle, when a specific combination of product and market 
dominates technological development, and when consumers are more inclined towards a 
particular design, firms have to abandon their unsuccessful product-market combinations 
in favour of a more successful competing design. Once a dominant design has been 
established, firms will start to compete on price, and economies of scale become an 
important determinant in order to survive, which can lead to start of an oligopolistic 
shake out. 
Many firms that fail to achieve a minimum efficient production scale must sooner or later 
leave the market, which results in a market dominated by a few large firms competing on 
price (Klepper, 1996). Nevertheless, firms facing Bertrand competition possess a strong 
incentive to increase their profit margin through product differentiation, and will 
therefore reap more sales from new products if their products succeed in time (Martin, 
1993; Kaniovski, 2005). Small firms, in turn, possess a strong incentive to introduce new 
products into the market in order to survive competition with current firms. Large firms 
have an incentive to invest in both process (economies of scale) and product innovation 
(economies of scope) in order to maintain their market position (Cohen and Klepper, 
1996). Aghion et al. (2005) show that an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
competition and innovation is a good fit, which challenges both empirical and theoretical 
findings in the traditional literature. 
A patent rewards an invention, a new technology, which sometimes results in the 
creation of a new market. In that case, the effect of patents from the time period without 
the protected invention to the time period with the protected invention is not to restrict 
competition on markets already existing in the previous period of time, but to create a 
new market (possibly monopolised, but still better than no market at all). Second, 
patents offer a substitute to secrecy and involve disclosure, hence they encourage further 
innovation (i.e. competition of new products against existing ones). Third, patents can 
serve the creation of new companies by protecting them from competitive strategies 
based on incumbency, such as size, brand or sunk costs (Guellec at al., 2007). 
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Firms tend to patent more of their inventions when they are confronted with more 
intense competition. Weaker competition, due to regulation or high entry cost, provides 
protection other than IPR to the innovations of the incumbents, which then have little 
reason to incur the cost of filing IPR and disclosing their technology. However, as patents 
in turn reduce ex post the degree of competition on a market, it is difficult to observe 
correlation between patenting and competition at the market equilibrium (Guellec, 2007). 
8.3 What is new 
In knowledge-intensive industries, competition is based less on prices and current market 
share and more on new products and technologies and future market share. The market 
power criterion is more fragile as the state of play can be reshuffled by new technologies. 
Substitute products are not the current competitors but the ones that will be on the 
market in the future (Encaoua and Hollander, 2004). 
Reitzig (2004) shows that multiple patents per invention are filed in both discrete and 
complex technologies. In selected discrete technologies, patent fences may serve to 
exclude competitors whereas in complex technologies, patent thickets represent 
exchange forums for complementary technology. The results expand on traditional views 
of profitable patent exploitation across industries, which suggest that different legislative 
issues arise from multiple patenting per innovation in complex and discrete technologies 
depending on the degree of technological complementarity. The results have unexpected 
policy implications in that they illustrate how patentees could eliminate competition in the 
form of substitute technologies through fencing.  
In one case of the European Commission pharmaceutical sector inquiry, 1300 EU-wide 
patents (patent clusters) were filed for a single medicine. The inquiry pointed out that 
nearly 700 cases of reported patent litigation with generic companies were filed. 
Although the generic companies won some of these cases, there were many settlement 
agreements for ending an ongoing litigation or dispute. These specific settlements limited 
the entry to the market of the generic medicines and provided for payments from the 
originator to the generic companies. Moreover, the report found strangulation of 
innovation, as some originator companies used defensive patenting strategies, thus 
obstructing the path of innovation from competing pharmaceutical companies and 
delaying consumers’ access to innovative medicines (Singh, 2008). 
Roox et al. (2008) depict the key areas in which the patent system and the legal and 
regulatory framework fail to ensure an appropriate balance between incentives and 
competition, such as failings in the system for granting quality patents, patent thickets 
and follow-up patents, patent litigation procedures and other patent-related barriers. 
First of all, failings in the system for granting quality patents include: a lack of rigorous 
assessment of the patentability requirements, in particular of the inventive step, lack of 
quality of applications, examiners’ inability to check data presented to them, not enough 
consideration of third-party observation by examiners and weaknesses in the opposition 
procedure. Second, patent thickets and follow-up patents include unjustifiable extension 
of the monopoly through follow-up patents, multiple divisional patent applications that 
are entirely identical to the parent specifying data without linking it to the claims, second 
and subsequent use claims, and genuine incremental innovation compared to simple 
changes. Third, patent litigation procedures include the complexity and unpredictability of 
litigation across the EU and improper granting of interim injunctions. Finally, other 
patent-related barriers cover patent linkage, statements to authorities, shifting consumer 
demand with marketing campaigns and supplementary protection certificates granted on 
the basis of incorrect information. 
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8.4 Policy implications 
Patents can be used in anti-competitive strategies, whose aim is to exclude other 
companies (competitors) from the market. In that context, patents are not just means to 
exclude competitors, they are instruments used by incumbent firms to raise entry 
barriers. Patents are also used by new entrants to penetrate markets. Patents are used in 
standard setting processes and for making alliances. This diversified role of patents 
renders their effect on competition more complex. Some anti-competitive strategies are 
clearly illegal, others are abuses of the system, permitting an undue extension of the 
exclusive right beyond the one granted by the patent office. These practices can be 
deterred, and often are, by a close monitoring by competition authorities. A question 
raised to patent offices is to what extent could such practices be hampered upstream, by 
granting patents which would not facilitate, or would even hamper them? Could patent 
law and practice tackle some of these problems? (Guellec et al., 2007). 
Pharmaceutical companies enjoy patent protection for their products. Once the patent 
has expired, producers of similar generic products can enter the market. Pharmaceutical 
companies that try to prolong patent protection for a product may breach EU competition 
rules. Such behaviour can also have the side effect of removing incentives to innovate, as 
competition from generic products encourages the creation of new products. In this 
respect, AstraZeneca had abused the patent system and the system for authorisation of 
medicines with the aim of delaying competition to a blockbuster drug from generic and 
parallel imported pharmaceuticals. AstraZeneca was fined €60 million. The appeal is 
currently pending before the Court of First Instance. As a result of this first case, the 
Commission intensified the monitoring of competition in the sector of generic medicines. 
The first findings indicate that competition in the market for human medicines may not 
be working well in Europe; fewer new medicines are being brought to market and the 
entry of generic medicines sometimes seems to be delayed. The Commission has 
therefore opened a sector inquiry to investigate the reasons for this (European 
Commission, 2009). 
There is a need for the proper balance between the patent-related contracts and their 
impact on competition. The patent uses have been watched by competition authorities. 
Patent licences can be used for sharing markets by the inclusion of territorial exclusivity, 
or fixing prices even indirectly. Cross-licences can be regarded as tools for collusion and 
as barriers to entry. Patent pools are subject to regulatory clearance because they could 
result in a monopoly. The multiplicity of patents over a single area, with royalty-stacking, 
can cost so much that it might hamper innovation. The large number of patent holders 
might result in ‘the tragedy of anti-commons’, chronic under-use of patented resources. 
Alternatives to competition and patents are Open Source, open science, open access, 
open innovation and open standards. Open Source projects are based on collaborative 
innovation and are characterised by a non-proprietary setting. Open science offers free 
collaboration and rapid public disclosure of results with no restrictions on use other than 
acknowledging the source. Open access provides users free reading, downloading, 
copying, distributing, printing, searching or linking. Open innovation prioritises 
partnering, licensing and venturing to combine internal and external sources of ides and 
technologies. Open standards are publicly available specifications which give a common 
method of achieving a particular goal (European Patent Office, 2007).  
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The financial institutions have devised various tools for patent holders to obtain monetary 
value from their patents more promptly than collecting royalties from licences. These 
mechanisms include securitisation based on anticipated royalty income streams, auction 
of patents, patent collateralisation, patent sale-lease-back arrangement, and patent 
litigation insurance.  
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9 CONFERENCE 
The topics dealt in this study were presented in a conference. As the first step in the 
current project, and in view of the results of the previous project, STOA organised a 
conference with the goal of reviewing issues related to the current status of governance 
of the European patent system. One important aim was to work towards building a 
discussion platform and a resource for further policy actions linking MEPs from different 
committees with stakeholders in order to improve decision making on IPR-related issues. 
The conference was held in the European Parliament premises in Brussels, Belgium, on 
17 March 2009. Registration was open at 
http://www.onetec.be/meetbridge/index.asp?id=2587 until 6 March 2009.   
Candidate speakers were approached for availability based upon an initial draft 
programme. The European Parliament issued formal invitations to speakers based on 
confirmation. Invitation letters for speakers, MEPs and audience were drafted. A poster 
for internal use was designed. An online registration form and ad-hoc email address were 
created and made operational due to the capacity of the room. A preliminary list of 
attendees was drafted. Dissemination of the event to invitees took place as soon all the 
speakers were confirmed. 
In the conference, we aimed to provide the audience with a clear idea of the 
achievements and of the follow-up which will go forward afterwards. In this respect, the 
following points were used to frame the speech of speakers: 
 legislative proposals from the European Commission and Council working group 
regarding different aspects of patents covering relevant issues; 
 why these issues are important or not (arguments with figures if possible); 
 the need to point towards certain policy options; what needs to be solved in what 
timeframe. 
The slides of the presentations are available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/stoa/events/workshop/20090317/default_en.htm 
A Draft Report was prepared as a background paper for the conference. That paper and 
the input from the conference have contributed to the formulation of this Final Report. 
This study aims at providing a balanced view on how important these problems are and 
why. The topics of this study follow. 
The backlog issue: Over the last decade, the time for getting a patent, as well as the 
related backlog of patents has risen considerably. The consequence of this is an increase 
of legal uncertainty. 
Patent enforcement: While European legislators are still negotiating a European Union 
(EU) Patent Litigation System which should handle disputes relating to both existing 
European Patents and Future Community Patents, small and medium size enterprises 
(SMEs) already encounter difficulties in enforcing their rights before national jurisdictions.  
Regional dimension of IPR in Europe: The EU's Regional Policy is more and more 
associated with the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy, which aims at building up 
Europe as a world leader in the field of the 'Knowledge Based Economy.' Consequently, 
the funds made available for achieving this goal, which come under the competitiveness 
programmes, have dramatically increased over the past few years.  
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Patent and standardisation: In an information and communication technology (ICT) 
oriented world, standards are a key driver for innovation. However, co-existence with 
patents raises some questions. What could be the interface between ICT standardisation 
policy, IPR and competition law? What could be the balance between IPR, inter-
operability and competitiveness? How to ensure a correct balance between the interests 
of licensees and licensors and the transparency of licensing? How to identify relevant IPR 
in connection with standards?  
The use of existing patents: Third Parties have access to relevant information relating to 
European patent applications via free access websites. However, once the European 
patent has been granted, it becomes a bundle of national patents governed by national 
laws.  
Patent and competition: In the past few decades, the European Court of Justice has 
made the legal distinction between the existence and the exercise of IPR. While the first 
is not challenged per se, the second one has to comply with competition rules. 
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9.1 Conference programme  
 
8.00 8.30 WP8 Check-in 
Entrance Rue Wiertz 60, 
Brussels 
9.00 9.15  Welcome and opening remarks 
 
Philippe Busquin 
MEP Chairman of STOA 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
 
Wim Van der Eijk  
Vice-President 
EUROPEAN PATENT 
OFFICE 
 
9.15 9.30 WP8 
Current policy issues in the 
governance of the European patent 
system 
 
Ove Granstrand 
Chalmers University 
ETEPS 
 
9.30 10.30 WP8 
European Patent 
Court and 
Community Patent 
Rapporteur: 
Dr Jos Leijten  
(ETEPS) 
 
Leonidas Karamountzos  
Council Secretariat 
COUNCIL OF THE EU 
 
Oliver Varhelyi 
Head of Unit IP 
DG Internal Market & 
Services  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
10.30 11.00 Break 
11.00 12.00 WP3 Patent enforcement 
Rapporteur: 
Dr Giuseppe 
Scellato  
(Rosselli 
Foundation) 
 
John Taylor 
Risk Management, 
Security and Specific 
Controls 
 
  
IP/A/STOA/2009-01 50 PE 424.763
Current policy issues in the governance of the European patent system 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
DG Taxation and Customs 
Union 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Patrick Ravillard 
ACTA negotiations 
DG Trade 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
12.00 12.30 WP4 
Regional dimension 
of IPR in Europe:  
Knowledge based 
economy, innovation 
and IPR 
Rapporteur: 
Dr Bianca 
Poti’  
(CNR) 
 
Thierry Sueur 
Vice-President European 
and International Affairs 
Air Liquide 
BUSINESSEUROPE 
 
Stéphane Drouin 
Head of European Patent 
Department 
PFIZER – EFPIA 
 
12.30 14.30 Break 
14.30 15.00 WP1 The backlog issue 
Rapporteur: 
Dr Jos Leijten 
(ETEPS) 
 
Wim Van der Eijk  
Vice-President 
EUROPEAN PATENT 
OFFICE 
 
15.00 15.30 WP6 
The use of existing 
patents 
Rapporteur: 
Dr Jos Leijten  
(ETEPS) 
 
Guus Broesterhuizen 
President 
NETHERLANDS PATENT 
OFFICE 
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15.30 16.00 WP5 
Patent and 
standardisation 
Rapporteur: 
Dr Giuseppe 
Scellato  
(Rosselli 
Foundation) 
Thomas Kramler 
Case Handler, Unit 
Antitrust: IT, Internet & 
Consumer Electronics 
DG Competition 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
16.00 16.30 WP7 Patent and competition 
Rapporteur: 
Dr Victor 
Rodriguez  
(TNO) 
 
Filip Borkowski 
Inquiry into the 
Pharmaceutical Sector 
DG Competition 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
16.30 17.45 WP2 
Round table discussion 
The enhancement of 
patent awareness 
within the European 
Parliament 
 
Moderator:  
Prof Ove 
Granstrand 
(Chalmers) 
 
Rapporteur: 
Dr Bianca 
Poti’  
(CNR) 
 
Karsten Meinhold 
Director Industry and 
Public Relations  
SIEMENS-NOKIA 
NETWORKS 
 
Greg Perry 
Director General 
EUROPEAN GENERIC 
MEDICINES 
ASSOCIATION 
 
Maria Cimaglia 
Legal Affairs 
EUROPEAN 
ASSOCIATION OF CRAFT, 
SMALL AND MEDIUM-
SIZED ENTERPRISES 
 
Pierre Brisson 
Chairman of the Board 
PROTON EUROPE 
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Marc Ledoux 
Director of Industrial 
Policy  
CENTRE NATIONAL DE 
LA RECHERCHE 
SCIENTIFIQUE 
 
Josef Kratochvil 
Vice-President 
CZECH INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY OFFICE 
 
Tim Frain 
Director IPR Regulatory 
Affairs 
NOKIA CORPORATION 
 
17.45 18.00  Closing remarks  
 
Wim Van der Eijk  
Vice-President 
EUROPEAN PATENT 
OFFICE 
 
 
N.B. 
Interpretation services available between 9.00 and 12.30 C.E.T. and between 15.00 and 
18.00 C.E.T. 
Due to security reasons, the check-in start at 8.00 and close at 8.30 C.E.T. 
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10 FINAL REMARKS 
A Draft Report was prepared as a background paper for the conference organised by 
STOA on current policy issues in the governance of the European patent system. That 
paper and the input from the conference speakers and attendants have contributed to 
the formulation of this Final Report. The current study covered current policy issues in 
the governance of the European patent system, such as the backlog problem, the 
enhancement of patent awareness within the European Parliament, patent enforcement, 
the regional dimension of intellectual property in Europe, patents and standardisation, 
the use of existing patents, and patents and competition.  
It is worth mentioning that the conference contributed to the discussion of the multi-level 
governance issues with stakeholders from European to national patent offices, from 
private to public sector actors. As a result of the conference, it was stated the need for 
an IP strategy for Europe. 
First, an increase in the size of the workload of the European Patent Office has been 
observed due to a rise in the number of patent applications, which brings up a critical 
workload and quality issue, known as the backlog issue. Much has been written about the 
factors which partly explain the increase in patent applications, such as the filing route, 
the sector, the geographical origin of patents, the firm’s experience in patenting, the 
number of inventors and international patent classes. Recently,  the Administrative 
Council was recommended to: utilise work carried out by other patent offices, applicants 
and third parties; to raise the bar for patent granting; to improve efficiency; to boost 
cooperation; and to improve the ability to deal with new challenges, and reviewing 
governance and finance issues. As far as the future is concerned, the Administrative 
Council Survey considers three scenarios and anticipates that except in a scenario of 
extreme growth, the programme of recruitment, building and training will more than 
cope with the demand. 
Second, a well-functioning and legitimate patent system is of uppermost importance for a 
knowledge-based economy. It sustains research and development, innovation, market 
penetration and welfare and it requires a strategy. Improvement of the European patent 
system requires strengthening the role and expertise of the European Parliament in 
patent-related issues and accommodating the rise of public concern for patent matters. 
Complexity, extension and changes of the European patent system are among the 
reasons for improving the awareness of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). 
There are two critical aspects: the inherent expansionist drive and the fact that 
innovation has to be qualified in terms of efficiency, sustainability and social desirability. 
A strategy does not mean a stronger intellectual property rights regime, but a balanced 
system, capable of matching different stakeholders’ interests. Effectiveness and 
legitimacy of the intellectual property systems are currently under scrutiny. The overall 
success of the governance of the European patent system could be better assured by 
creating a diversified set of formal and informal mechanisms of legitimacy, expanding or 
creating new forums for dialogue with a wider range of representation, combining expert 
and non experts and opening the learning process.  
Third, a number of recent studies have highlighted an increase in patent disputes both in 
Europe and the United States, showing how the threat of being involved in a costly and 
uncertain infringement case, as well as the risk of retaliation, can negatively affect ex-
ante research and development incentives, particularly for less financially endowed 
companies.  
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Available data on infringement cases suggest that more valuable patents are more likely 
to be sued. The policy action for the enhancement of patent enforceability within the 
European patent system has to face a relevant constraint which relates to the absence of 
a unified jurisdiction for handling patent infringement cases. The analysis of patent 
litigation costs in Europe highlights an elevated cross-country variance and suggests that 
the introduction of a unified jurisdiction will lead to an increase in expected litigation 
costs only for those patentees that are now extending their rights to a very limited 
number of member states. While patent litigation insurance has long been considered a 
potentially powerful tool for ensuring access to the patent system for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), public support of the creation and development of an insurance 
market for the coverage of litigation costs does not seem to be an effective policy option. 
Public support for the diffusion of alternative forms of dispute resolution based on 
arbitration might contribute to enhance patent enforceability among innovative European 
firms. 
Fourth, the biggest challenges in many European countries in this respect is on the 
demand side, since often business are not research intensive or, in the case of SMEs, are 
not aware enough of the role of IPR in their innovation and growth, and are frightened by 
the IP costs. The European Commission has stressed the importance of a regional system 
based policy that is more oriented towards SMEs and can play a key role in promoting 
knowledge transfer from academic institutions to local industrial users. Regional policy 
actions receiving attention in this area include the support of the creation of new 
knowledge-based firms and the support of a greater awareness of patents’ role for 
private and social benefits (IP awareness programmes). Moreover knowledge transfer is 
an important complement to the intellectual property rights management within public 
research organisations and it is needed to assure the circulation of research results as 
well as intellectual assets exploitation. The specific local/regional role is seen as 
supporting an intellectual property collaborative model as alternative to a university and 
public research licence model. Some problematic aspects may be nevertheless 
underlined. University are relatively low oriented towards local systems on one side and 
regional contexts are positioned very differently with reference to newly emerging 
technologies, existing industrial capacities, knowledge and human resources basis. The 
regional selective environment could provide mechanisms for integration and innovation, 
but enhancing some direction can have the cost of blocking innovation into other 
frameworks. A more differentiated academic system can help a better integration with 
local industrial users, while regions can develop also more open interregional policies.  
Fifth, standardisation is an important enabler of innovation and the current 
standardisation models in Europe have to face new challenges generated by accelerated 
market cycles, the convergence in technologies and the increasing impact of intellectual 
property rights. A two-fold relationship exists between patents and standards: Firstly, the 
strategic exploitation of patents can prevent the creation of standards that would 
otherwise be socially desirable, and secondly, standards can excessively weaken or 
reinforce the market power provided by patents. Such a situation calls for policy 
interventions that properly balance the interests of the patentees and the need to 
guarantee a rapid diffusion of new technological standards. There is the need for an 
effective monitoring of the activities of standard setting organisations with particular 
reference to their transparency in the rules for affiliation of members, the disclosure of 
relevant patents and for the determination of royalties. Moreover, the increasing use of 
patent pools requires particular attention, as well as a shared view on the methodologies 
applicable to identifying the level of complementarity among patents included in the pool 
in order to ensure that the pool is welfare enhancing.  
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A major concern in standard setting processes relates to strategic conduct by firms that 
do not declare their ownership of patents essential to a standard in order to block it 
afterwards or to extract high royalties. While this type of behaviour, being detrimental to 
innovation, has been punished in Europe as an abuse of dominant position, the matter 
still needs further assessment and the development of shared policy orientations. 
Sixth, patents can be used for myriad purposes. Several uses of patents do not directly 
lead to the development of a new product, such as obtaining financing, boosting market 
valuation, creating patent thickets and deterring others from suing. In answering the 
questions as to what extent and for what purpose do innovative firms use patents, 
surveys show that patents should be considered as one component in the appropriation 
strategy of firms, and often not the most important one. Due to high costs, tedious, 
laborious and time-consuming procedures, language problems, ineffective and costly real 
protection of patent rights, and non-uniformity of systems, SMEs do not make extensive 
use of patents. The situation is, however, expected to improve if an effective and cost-
effective patent system is put in place in Europe. 
Finally, patents play the role of strengthening the market power that accrues to the 
successful inventor, hence reinforcing the incentive to innovate ex ante, but possibly 
weakening the incentive to innovate for the winner, at least ex post. Key areas in which 
the patent system and the legal and regulatory framework fail to ensure an appropriate 
balance between incentives and competition include failings in the system for granting 
quality patents, patent thickets and follow-up patents, patent litigation procedures and 
other patent-related barriers. The use of patents has been looked into by competition 
authorities, such as the European Commission in its investigations of the pharmaceutical 
sector. The financial institutions have devised various tools for patent holders which 
might need further observation by regulatory authorities. 
Lastly, STOA organised an IPR workshop during the Innovation Summit at the European 
Parliament in October 2009 in order to continue the IPR discussion.  
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11 ACRONYMS 
 
ADR  alternative dispute resolution 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
EPC  European Patent Convention 
EPLA  European Patent Litigation Agreement 
EPO  European Patent Office 
ERA  European Research Area 
EU  European Union 
GSM  Global System for Mobile communications 
HEIs  Higher Education Institutions 
ICT  information and communication technology 
IP  intellectual property 
IPR  intellectual property rights 
JPO  Japan Patent Office 
KT  knowledge transfer 
MEP  Member of the European Parliament 
NPM  New Public Management 
PCT  Patent Cooperation Treaty 
PRO  public research organisation 
R&D  research and development 
RAND  reasonable-and-non-discriminatory 
SACEPO Standing Advisory Committee before the European Patent Office 
S&T  science and technology 
SIPO  State Intellectual Property Office of China 
SME  small and medium sized enterprise 
SPLT  Substantive Patent Law Treaty 
SSO  standard setting organisation 
STOA  Scientific Technology Options Assessment 
TLO  technology licensing office 
USPTO  United States Patent Office 
WIPO  World Intellectual Property Organisation 
WSC  World Standards Cooperation 
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12 GLOSSARY 
 
allowance rate: number of applications that were granted during the reporting period, 
divided by the number of disposals in the reporting period. 
 
cross-licence: a contract by which two or more parties grant to each other access to 
some of their patents. 
 
defensive patent: patent to provide protection from litigation by allowing the holder to 
counter-sue or by preventing others from applying for the same or similar patent. 
 
essential patent: patent which discloses and claims one or more inventions that are 
required to practice a given industry standard. 
 
invent around: invent an alternative to a patented invention that does not infringe the 
patent’s claims. 
 
number of disposals: applications granted plus those abandoned or refused. 
 
patent ambush: situation in which when a member of a standard setting organisation 
withholds information, during participation in development and setting a standard, about 
a patent that the member owns, has pending, or intends to file, which is relevant to the 
standard, and subsequently the company asserts that a patent is infringed by use of the 
standard as adopted. 
 
patent clusters: see patent thicket. 
 
patent floods: see patent thicket. 
 
patent pool: agreement between two or more patent owners to licence one or more of 
their patents as a package to one another, and to third parties willing to pay the 
associated royalties. 
 
patent thicket: dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights. 
 
patent troll: person or company that enforces its patents against one or more alleged 
infringers often with no intention to manufacture or market the patented invention. 
 
picket fence: competitor’s strategy to contain the utility of another company’s key 
patents. 
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